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Pursuing a ship-based missile defense capability could thrust the naval service into
one of the most heated controversies ofthe past three decades: the congressional debate over
the desirability—or danger—of erecting widespread ballistic missile defenses. To better
understand the influences on congressional attitudes, this study examines five divisive
congressional debates over missile defense. In contrast to traditional explanations that focus
on the causal factors underlying congressional voting behavior, this thesis emphasizes the
political process of framing issues to create the political climates that shape congressional
attitudes and link them to voting decisions. This thesis shows that major shifts in missile
defense policy occur when key individuals successfully manipulate powerful images to
legitimize and popularize arguments favoring their desired policy option. Understanding how
elites use images to shape political attitudes provides a framework for charting and
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From the sky huge hailstones of about a hundred pounds will fall upon men. They
will weep and mourn and cry out: "In one hour such great wealth has been brought
to ruin." Every sea captain, and all who travel by ship, the sailors, and all who earn
their living from the sea, will stand far off.
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A broad political consensus favoring theater ballistic missile defense has emerged in
the wake of the Gulf War. Capitalizing on this consensus, the U.S. Navy is modifying its
Aegis ship system to develop a full range of upper and lower-tier theater ballistic missile
defense capabilities. Since rapid technical advances are making it difficult to distinguish
between theater and strategic missile defense systems, the current political consensus might
prove short lived. In fact, many politicians support or oppose theater ballistic missile
systems largely because of their hope or fear that these systems will evolve into a politically
controversial national missile defense capability. Pursuing a ship-based missile defense
capability could thrust the U.S. Navy into one of the most heated defense controversies of
the past three decades: the dispute over the desirability—or danger—of erecting widespread
ballistic missile defenses.
Missile defenses controversies have become a perennial characteristic of American
strategic discourse. Debates over whether missile defenses are destabilizing, inhibit
negotiations with the Russians, are necessary to counter missile threats from rogue states, or
are technically feasible remain unresolved. Underlying these debates are deeply held
convictions, or myths, about how deploying missile defenses might affect American security.
These disparate strategic beliefs are reflected in attempts to manipulate political attitudes
toward missile defense, and have fueled fluctuations in missile defense policy and funding.
To avoid the episodic funding that typically characterizes America missile defense efforts,
the naval service must comprehend the framing process that influences congressional
attitudes toward missile defense.
xi
A. FRAMING CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES
How do the political actions of influential individuals shape congressional attitudes
toward missile defense? Political scientists generally agree that Congress members support
initiatives that they perceive to combine good policy and good politics. While this is true,
voting decisions are not made in a vacuum. The political climate shapes congressional
perceptions ofa given policy initiative. This study demonstrates that congressional defense
policy making cannot be understood simply by examining the motivations underlying floor
votes on defense issues. In contrast to traditional explanations that focus on the causal factors
underlying congressional voting behavior, this thesis focuses on how the process of framing
political issues influences congressional decision making.
Framing—or myth making
—
places political incentives in a real context and shapes
congressional perceptions ofwhat constitutes sound policy. Elites use a variety oftechniques
to attract media coverage, interpret events and images, define the terms of the debate, and
foster a favorable climate of opinion surrounding their desired policy option. Congress
members, in turn, simultaneously take cues from the public and political leaders that
influence their attitudes and subsequent voting behavior.
This study examined the role ofthe framing process in four divisive national debates
over missile defense to draw implications for the Navy's role in the current missile defense
controversy. In each case examined, myths and images were decisive in perpetuating
strategic arguments and shaping congressional attitudes. During "The Great ABM Debate"
ofthe 1960s, elites successfully manipulated the image of a mushroom cloud exploding over
America's backyards to create intense public resistance to the Sentinel ABM system. Ten
xii
years later, President Reagan's crusade against the "evil empire" combined with horrific
descriptions of a nuclear holocaust gave political life to the nuclear freeze movement and
reinforced the desire for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). More recently, images of
Patriot missiles during Gulf War became the fulcrum for manipulating public and
congressional attitudes on funding missile defense.
Each of these cases illustrates that the success of any missile defense effort depends
largely upon the ability of key individuals to create or interpret events and images to
legitimize and popularize their arguments in favor of missile defenses. Today, elite opinion
concerning the strategic utility of missile defenses remains polarized. There is a balance of
myths. However, key players stand ready to seize the next powerful image to reinforce their
strategic arguments and tilt the political balance in favor of their desired missile defense
policies.
B. ADVOCATING AEGIS: THE WAY AHEAD!
The Navy has become embroiled in the most recent missile defense controversy.
Some national missile defense (NMD) advocates are supporting Navy missile defense
programs as a means of "achieving national missile defense through the back door." Thus,
sea-based missile defenses have become a cornerstone of the conservative push to defend
America from missile attacks. The ABM Treaty and public apathy, however, present major
political obstacles to Naval NMD. For this reason NMD From the Sea is an idea whose
political moment has not yet arrived. A public desire for NMD, however, may come sooner
than anyone thinks. Several alarming international trends—the proliferation of ballistic
xiii
missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and the increasing possibility of an accidental
launch—could fuel public anxieties and provide the opportunity for missile defense
advocates to foster a national consensus favoring withdrawal from the ABM treaty and
immediate deployment ofanNMD capability. When the political opportunity arises, history
has shown that key individuals can manipulate powerful images to shift the climate ofpublic,
Presidential, and congressional opinion starkly in favor of national missile defense.
Naval images are likely to play a role in a future effort to create a favorable climate
surrounding NMD because sea-based missile defenses have inherent domestic political
advantages over other missile defense options. Deploying land-based national missile
defenses evokes images ofhaving to fight the war literally "from America's backyards"; an
unsettling idea that generated widespread protest during previous ABM debates. The
American people prefer a forward defense that holds threats at arm's length. They expect
the American military to stand in harm's way as necessary to protect American lives,
property, and interests. Bringing the fight home is contrary to the American ethos. Mahan
got it right when he wrote, "every danger of a military character to which the United States
is exposed is best met outside her territory—at sea." Ifthe American public becomes anxious
about emerging missile threats, thenNMD From the Sea can provide a culturally consistent
answer: allowing Americans to envision a forward missile defense that interdicts the threat
"over there" and not over here.
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C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Prematurely pursuing a Naval NMD capability could undermine support for the Aegis
program . Continued public apathy on defense issues might allow the President to undermine
NMD initiatives with political impunity, regardless of congressional support. Maintaining
the shallow political consensus that is currently driving Navy missile defense programs will
require the Navy to walk a political tightrope between disparate political factions. Success
ultimately might rest on the cautious pursuit of ABM "treaty compliant" Navy theater
systems while making closely-held preparations to upgrade those systems to defend
American cities should a culmination of events, popular images, and political beliefs compel
political leaders to demand such a capability.
Studies are needed to examine the institutional, operational, and programmatic factors that
would underlie a Navy NMD effort . Success of Naval NMD will depend upon the
infrastructure underlying the Navy theater missile defense program. The Navy must identify
a clear path to overcoming institutional, financial, and technological hurdles to Naval NMD.
The right people must be positioned to establish clearly definable goals, demand that
milestones are reached on time, and ensure that resources are managed properly. Institutional
support inside the Navy must be cultivated and the operational implications ofthis new naval
mission must be fully explored.
The importance of naval images should not be underestimated . Naval leaders must think
through how the exploitation of naval images might complement or complicate the Navy's
xv
ability to accomplish its missions. Success or failure of a Naval NMD program is likely to
depend largely upon the ability ofkey individuals to create or interpret events and images to
legitimize and popularize their arguments in favor of the Navy's programs. Two sets of
images are important. To embrace the Naval NMD solution, the public and elites must first
imagine the seriousness of missile problem. Events—such as an Iranian nuclear test, a
missile attack on America or our allies, or widespread publicity of Russian command and
control problems—might create an opportunity for missile defense advocates to foster a
national consensus favoring withdrawal from the ABM treaty and immediate deployment of
an NMD capability.
When the nation calls, the Navy could be poised to offer a quick, cost-effective, and
culturally consistent. NMD solution . Disseminating images of surface combatants
conducting theater missile defense demonstrations and exercises could pave the way for
public support of Naval NMD. Properly presented, the NMD From the Sea concept could
help alleviate public fears of foreign missiles by establishing a forward defense of the
homeland while serving America's mission to provide an extended defense that promotes
world stability. Naval NMD is a natural defense of the United States. Just as Aegis was the
mythological shield that protected Zeus from deadly threats, when the missile threat becomes
apparent to the American people—the image of Aegis ships standing in harm's way to shield
American cities might be an important factor in shaping future congressional attitudes toward
missile defense.
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I. STRATEGIC MYTHS AND FRAMING DEFENSE POLICY
A. INTRODUCTION
A broad political consensus favoring theater ballistic missile defenses has emerged
in the wake ofthe Gulf War. Capitalizing on this consensus, the U.S. Navy is modifying its
Aegis ship system to develop a full range of upper and lower-tier theater ballistic missile
defense capabilities. Since rapid technical advances are making it difficult to distinguish
between theater and strategic missile defense systems, the current political consensus might
prove short lived. In fact, many politicians support or oppose theater ballistic missile
systems largely because of their hope or fear that these systems will evolve into a politically
controversial national missile defense capability. Pursuing a ship-based missile defense
capability could thrust the U.S. Navy into one of the most heated defense controversies of
the past three decades: the dispute over the desirability—or danger—of erecting widespread
ballistic missile defenses.
Missile defense controversies have become a perennial characteristic of American
strategic discourse. Debates over whether missile defenses are destabilizing, inhibit
negotiations with the Russians, are necessary to counter missile threats from rogue states, or
are technically feasible remain unresolved. Underlying the debates are deeply held
convictions, or myths, about how deploying missile defenses might affect American security.
These disparate beliefs were reflected in attempts to manipulate the broader range of political
attitudes toward missile defense and have fueled fluctuations in missile defense policy and
funding. To avoid the episodic funding that has typically characterized America missile
defense efforts, the naval service must comprehend the framing process that influences
congressional attitudes toward missile defense.
How do the political actions of influential individuals shape congressional attitudes
toward missile defense? Traditional explanations of congressional behavior focus on the
political incentives that drive congressional voting behavior. Political scientists generally
agree that Congress members support initiatives that they perceive to combine good policy
and good politics. While this is true, widely ignored is the political process that places
political incentives in a real context and shapes congressional perceptions of a given policy
initiative. In contrast to traditional explanations that focus on the causal factors underlying
congressional voting behavior, this thesis focuses on how the process of framing political
issues influences congressional decision making.
Framing constitutes a strategy through which key political elites attempt to convince
the public and fellow elites ofthe validity of their beliefs and supporting policy imperatives. 1
Elites use a variety of techniques to attract media coverage, interpret events and images,
define the terms of the debate, and foster a favorable climate of opinion surrounding their
desired policy option. Shaping the climate of opinion influences congressional perceptions
of what constitutes sound policy.
Framing is important to any political debate, but in areas of intense strategic
uncertainty, like nuclear weapons and missile defense, efforts to frame congressional
attitudes become even more salient. With the prospect of nuclear Armageddon held in the
balance and a lack of any concrete evidence to support their beliefs, key players in the anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) debate consistently manipulate powerful images to perpetuate their
1 Randal B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, "How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense
Policy," in Congress Resurgent ed. Randal B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1993), 32-35.
strategic arguments. For example, elites successfully manipulated the image of a mushroom
cloud exploding over America's backyards to create intense public resistance to the Sentinel
ABM system during "the Great ABM Debate" of the 1960s. Ten years later, President
Reagan's crusade against the "evil empire" combined with several horrific literary
descriptions of a nuclear holocaust gave political life to the nuclear freeze movement and
reinforced the desire for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). More recently, the images
of the Patriot missile during Gulf War became the fulcrum for manipulating public and
congressional attitudes toward increased missile defenses funding.
This thesis uses interviews with key individuals, recently unclassified documents, and
secondary sources to show how each of these cases highlights the significance of
personalities, beliefs, and images to the missile defense debate. It identifies a framework for
charting the political storm that is likely to surround the development of future missile
defense systems. Success of missile defense efforts depend largely upon the ability of key
individuals to create or interpret events and images to legitimize and popularize their
arguments in favor ofmissile defenses. Understanding the framing of congressional attitudes
is important when considering the pursuit of a National Missile Defense (NMD) From the
Sea capability. I argue that maintaining the shallow political consensus favoring Navy
missile defense programs will require the Navy to walk a political tightrope between
disparate political factions. Success might ultimately rest on the cautious pursuit ofABM
"treaty compliant" Navy theater systems while making closely-held preparations to upgrade
those systems to defend American cities should a culmination of events, popular images, and
political beliefs compel political leaders to demand such a capability.
This chapter introduces a theoretical framework for understanding the shaping of
congressional attitudes. Section B introduces a new theory of congressional behavior that
focuses on the process of framing political attitudes. Section C explores the relevance of the
contending deferential, parochial, policy theories of congressional behavior. Section D
identifies and defines the strategic myths surrounding missile defenses. Section E details the
role of elites and images in the process of framing strategic arguments. Section F outlines
the scope and organization of the study.
B. SHAPING CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES
The academic literature provides three distinct "conceptual lenses" to view
congressional behavior on defense issues.2 Political scientists argue that Congress members
either (1) defer to the executive branch on defense issues, playing only a minor role the
weapons acquisition process, (2) evaluate defense programs only with respect to parochial
economic and social interests, or (3) promote their conception of good defense policy within
the constraints placed on them by their constituents.3 Each of these arguments offers
valuable insight into congressional voting behavior. However, each argument fails to capture
the significance of individual personalities and political maneuvering in setting the defense
policy agenda, framing the important issues, and shaping congressional attitudes.
2 The term conceptual lenses is from Graham Allison, Essence ofDecision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), v. For a concise description of the three conceptual lenses to
view congressional behavior on defense policy see James M. Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 7-22.
3 Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons, 7-22.
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To better understand the congressional role in formulation of defense policy a fourth
approach that emphasizes the relationship between political elites, strategic beliefs, and
popular images is needed. My argument is that major shifts in defense policy occur when
key individuals—whom I refer to as myth makers4—successfully manipulate powerful
images to perpetuate their beliefs and shift the balance of public and elite opinion in favor
of their desired policies.
Traditional explanations explore the causal factors underlying congressional attitudes
as reflected in voting behavior. In contrast, my approach emphasizes the political processes
that frame issues and create the political climates that shape congressional attitudes and link
causal factors to congressional voting decisions. Understanding the relationship between
political elites, strategic beliefs, and popular images to the making of defense policy is not
intended to replace deferential, parochial, or policy lenses; instead, it provides a framework
for explaining how each is relevant to the framing of congressional attitudes.
C. THE RELEVANCE OF CONTENDING ARGUMENTS
1. The Deferential Lens
The deferential lens emphasizes congressional acquiescence to the executive branch
on strategic issues.
5 This approach seemed to be particularly relevant prior to the late 1960s;
4 For a complete discussion of the central role myth makers can play in the weapons acquisition
process see Peter R. Lavoy, Learning to Live with the Bomb? India and Nuclear Weapons, 1947-1974,
PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1997; see also Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and
the Causes of Proliferation," Security Studies 2, no. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1990): 206.
5 For example, see Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1994).
the subsequent hotly contested policy debates over missile defense and other weapons
systems suggest that deferential theories of congressional behavior have diminished utility.6
Today, members of Congress regularly and publicly challenge the President on defense
issues. 7 Recent studies suggest that Congress members rarely defer to the President's
authority on military acquisitions unless they agree or are indifferent toward his policy or
they believe opposition would unjustifiably impair the President's ability to conduct foreign
affairs.
8 Moreover, to suggest that Congress simply submits to executive authority misses
an important point. By virtue of his position, the President is potentially the nation's most
powerful myth maker. Exploiting the bully pulpit and his foreign policy responsibilities, the
President can frame the terms of the defense debate to shift public and congressional opinion
in his direction. Thus, a combination of deference and Presidential influence can ensure
executive dominance of defense issues.
The President, however, is still constrained by popular perceptions that often lie
beyond his control. If the President's defense policies are inconsistent with those
perceptions, he will leave an opening for other political elites to act. For example, the Bush
administration was slow to reshape its defense expenditures after the fall of the Berlin Wall
and impending collapse of the Soviet Union. This allowed congressional elites—namely
6 Edward C. Lawrence, "The Changing Role of Congress in Defense Policy-Making," Journal of
Conflict Resolution 20 (June 1976): 213-253.
7 Randal B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: An
Overview," in Congress Resurgent eds. Randal B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1993), 11.
8 James M. Lindsay, "Congress and the Defense Budget: Parochialism of Policy," in Arms,
Politics, and the Economy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Roger Higgs (New York:
Holmes and Meyer, 1990), 178-197.
Senator Sam Nunn and Congressman Les Aspin—to seize the initiative, manipulate the
images of Cold War collapse, and shift the balance of congressional opinion in favor of their
own defense initiatives.9
2. The Parochial Lens
Pork barreling—a Congress member's predisposition to support programs based on
local economic incentives—is widely accepted as the primary motive for congressional
voting behavior on defense issues. 10 The parochial lens has powerful intuitive appeal. Most
voting studies, however, suggest that constituency benefits have little influence on how
members vote. 11 One striking example is a study that shows that congressional Doves voted
thirty-four to six against SDI funding, despite the fact that their districts each hosted a major
SDI contractor. 12 These studies show that ideological beliefs—not parochial interests—are
the best predictor ofhow members vote on strategic issues.
Arguments discounting the parochial lens often ignore the most important parochial
imperative: public opinion. 13 The direction and intensity of public attitudes are undoubtably
9 See Paul Stockton, "Beyond Micromanagement: Congressional Budgeting for a Post-Cold War
Military," Political Science Quarterly 1 10, no. 2 (1995): 233-259.
10 Richard Fitzgerald and Gerald Lipson, Pork Barrel: The Unexpurgated Grace Commission
Story ofProfligacy (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1994).
11 For a bibliography of these works see Lindsay, "Parochialism or Policy?" 197.
12 Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons, 110.
13 Larry M. Bartels, "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan
Defense Build Up," American Political Science Review 85, no. 2 (June 1992): 457-473.
the most powerful impetus for congressional action. 14 Congress members ultimately rely on
active local constituencies to support their reelection. Despite the existence of a local
defense contractor, a representative's vocal, supportive constituency may oppose a particular
defense policy. 15 Furthermore, members instinctively respond to perceived shifts in public
attitudes.
16
Factors driving changes in public opinion can also stimulate changes in a
congressional attitudes for both substantive and political reasons. 17 Sociologists suggest that
in the process of making decisions Congress members simultaneously take cues from the
public and political leaders that shape their opinions and subsequent voting behavior. 18
3. The Policy Lens
Some congressional theorists argue "that members of Congress pursue their
conceptions of good public policy subject to constituency constraints."19 Policy lens
protagonists argue that people run for elected office seeking the power to advance their ideas
of good public policy. Continued policy influence, however, depends upon reelection.
14 Roger H. Davidson, "Congress and the American People," in Congressional Politics, ed.
Christopher J. Deering (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1989), 308.
15 For an explanation of supportive constituencies see Eileen Burgin, "The Influence of
Constituents: Congressional Decision Making on Issues of foreign Policy and Defense," in Congress
Resurgent, 67-88.
16
Battels, "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making," 457-473.
17 The difference between political and policy preferences is very hard to distinguish but the fact
that congress is responsive to the intensity of public opinion seems irrefutable.
18 Donald R. Matthews and James A. Stimson, Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-Making in the
U.S. House ofRepresentatives (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975).
19
Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons, 137.
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Making good policy and getting reelected are not necessarily mutually exclusive goals. In
fact, if a member's "substantive actions appear 'responsible' and 'statesmenlike' to
constituents; this is good electoral politics."20
John Kingdon writes that it is "hard to account for the observed voting behavior [in
Congress] with out invoking some version of legislators' ideology or conception of good
public policy as a major part of the explanation."21 Supporters of the policy lens assert that
members have wide policy latitude within the boundaries of (what they judge to be)
constituent constraints.22 But constituent opinion becomes increasingly influential in shaping
congressional attitudes as issues become more salient.23 Any coherent theory of
congressional behavior cannot escape the centrality of political beliefs in the making of
public policy. However, the policy lense has limited utility in the absence of an estimate of
how various factors and political processes—such as constituent opinion and myth
making—interrelate to shape a member's conception of public policy.
D. STRATEGIC MYTHS AND MISSILE DEFENSES
Congressional attitudes are invariably influenced by some combination ofdeferential,
parochial, and policy imperatives. Framing—or myth making—is the process that ties these
20 Jonathon E. Medalia, "Congress and Political Guidance of Weapons Procurement," Naval War
College Review 28 (Fall 1975): 20-21.
21 John W. Kingdon, "Ideas, Politics, and Public Policies," paper presented at the 1988 Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 6.
22 Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons, 137.
23 John W. Kingdon, Congressional Voting Decisions, 3rd. ed. (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1989), 43-45.
factors together. The President and other influential elites create or interpret powerful public
images to perpetuate strategic myths to influence constituent and congressional attitudes
toward missile defense.
Peter R. Lavoy uses the term nuclear myth to denote "an unverifiable belief about the
relationship between a state's nuclear weapons policy and its national security, prestige, or
power."24 This contrasts with the popular conception of myths as "fictitious stories,"25 and
with Jack Synder's description of myths as a specific set of incorrect strategic concepts.26
Lavoy points out that the absence of a scientific method underpinning nuclear strategy
suggests that the strategic and political consequences of nuclear weapons acquisition "can
be believed but not reliably known."27 The factual or fictitious nature of nuclear beliefs is
generally indeterminate and somewhat irrelevant to the nuclear weapons decision-making
process. The outcome of a nuclear weapons policy debate ultimately depends "upon the
ability of a myth maker to legitimize and popularize his or her beliefs among fellow elites
and then persuade national leaders to act on these views."28
24 See Lavoy, Learning to Live with the Bomb?, 45.
25 The definition of myths as "fictitious stories" is the third dictionary description. Lavoy 's
argument is to meant to convey an adaption of the first definition of myths as "a traditional story of
unknown authorship, ostensibly with a historical basis, but serving usually to explain some phenomenon of
nature, the origin of man, or the customs, institutions, religious rites (beliefs) of a people." See Webster's
New World Dictionary Third College Addition (New York: Simon and Schuster Macmillan Co., 1994),
898. Similarly, it follows that in the context of this discussion myths are stories that convey unscientific
accounts, theories, and beliefs to explain the relationship between arms and security.
26 Jack Synder, Myths ofEmpire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1991).




Lavoy's emphasis on the unscientific nature of nuclear myths and central role of
nuclear myth makers has greatly increased our understanding ofnuclear weapons acquisition
decisions. The logic and relevance of his argument, however, goes well beyond nuclear
weapons. I argue that the decision to develop any new weapons systems—not just nuclear
weapons—is always ultimately based on political, rather than scientific or mathematical
calculations. For the purpose of this study, therefore, myths are defined more broadly as
unverified beliefs concerning the relationship between a state 's military policies and its
national security, prestige, andpower.
The uncertain relationship between arms and national security is a constant ofmodern
history and a persistent topic of American political discourse. For example, during the
Constitutional Convention of 1 787 an intense debate ensued over the necessity to provide
congress the authority "to provide and maintain a Navy."29 Anti-federalists argued that
building a fleet would "incite the nations of Europe against us.. .to crush us in our infancy."30
Federalists—following the lead of Alexander Hamilton—countered that a strong navy was
essential if the United States expected to remain neutral in wars between Great Britain and
France. Moreover, Hamilton insisted that a navy would assure "national respectability
...allowing the United States to become the arbiter of Europe and America."31
The fate of the Navy—and the fledgling nation's defense—rested on the
persuasiveness of Hamilton and other key delegates in advancing their ideas about the






relationship between weapons, security, and prestige. Each side presented anecdotal
evidence to reinforce its beliefs. None of these beliefs, however, could be proven. But the
federalists were able to shift the balance of public and delegate opinion in favor of a Navy
by propagating persuasive personal arguments in the media—as embodied by the Federalist
Papers. 32
The inherent uncertainties of how military policies influence a nation's security,
power, and prestige suggest that myths and myth making are key factors in shaping attitudes
toward any defense policy. In matters of nuclear strategy the phenomenon is exacerbated.
The high stakes of nuclear Armageddon combined with the inability to verify the
international consequences of employing various strategic systems generates intensely held
personal beliefs and forces those beliefs into the realm of theology.33
Scholars identify several reasons why American strategic beliefs are intensely
mythical. Ages of religious teachings have imbued society with myths concerning its
ultimate destruction. Popular nuclear science and nostalgia provide a realistic mechanism
for imagining the apocalypse and fosters an inescapable shadow of nuclear anxiety to loom
over the American psyche.34 The imprecise strategic implications of the nuclear revolution
also mean that decision makers must rely on tenuous theoretical assumptions to imagine how
32 Hagan, The People 's Navy, 26.
33 Robert Jervis, The Meaning ofthe Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospectsfor
Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
34 This point is made nicely by Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History ofImages (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1988); and more recently by David L. Williams, Nuclear Myths and Social
Discourse: The U.S. Decision to Pursue Nuclear Weapons, Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
December 1996.
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nuclear weapons policies might influence international political outcomes.35 A fortunate lack
of experience with nuclear confrontation, however, leaves various strategic beliefs untested
and essentially untestable.36 These troubling unknowns evoke a typical human psychological
reaction; an almost religious faith in one's beliefs provides the explanatory context for
coping with otherwise mentally unsettling issues.
Myths are the cognitive context in which strategic debates are conducted. Thus, any
position on missile defenses is based on a set of strategic tenets. Beliefs about national
missile defenses that are specifically designed to counter long-range missiles carrying nuclear
warheads rest almost exclusively in the realm of strategic theology. However, there are
contradicting claims about their strategic relevance of theater missile defenses. For example,
the prevailing
—
yet far from unanimous—myth today is that deploying theater missile
defenses would have little impact on the strategic nuclear equation.37 But, a sizable minority
of influential political elites contend that theater defenses—Navy systems in
particular—could endanger American security by undermining the ABM Treaty and
35 See Phil E. Tetlock, "Psychological Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence," American Review of
Psychology 42 (1991): 239-176; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,"
International Organizations 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 371-402; and Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic
Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no.4 (Summer 1995): 695-753.
36 For a thorough discussion of the spectrum of "untestable beliefs" held by key players in the
strategic nuclear debate see Robert A. Levine, Still The Arms Debate (Brookfield, Vermont: Gower
Publishing Co., 1990), 1 17-203; see also Robert Jervis, The Meaning ofthe Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft
and the Prospectsfor Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); David Goldfischer, The Best
Defense (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1993), 13-50; and Jack N. Barkenbus and Alvin M. Wienberg,
eds., Stability and Strategic Defenses (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute Press, 1989).
37 Over the past six years TMD programs have passed Congress with little opposition. William J.
Perry, "Protecting the Nation Through Missile Defense," Defense Issues 1 1 , no. 37, 1 . Secretary Perry
points out that "Congress fully supports our defense against this threat (theater ballistic missile)."
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upsetting strategic stability.
38 These contradictory beliefs are integral to any theater ballistic
missile defense (TBMD) debate.
Congressional attitudes toward missile defense reflect the strategic myths—the
unverified beliefs about the relationship between weapons of mass destruction, missile
defenses, and security—that surround the missile defenses debate. Although attitudes
towards missile defense encompass a wide spectrum of ideas, they can be grouped into three
categories: Hawks, Doves, and Owls.39 Strategic Hawks are individuals who believe that
missile defenses increase security by reducing the vulnerability of both the strategic arsenal
and the American public. Strategic Doves are people who believe that deployment of
strategic defenses is destabilizing and would unnecessarily escalate the nuclear arms race
bringing the nation closer to the brink of nuclear war. Strategic Owls, or moderates, are
individuals who only favor missile defense for limited protection or in an overall deterrent-
stabilizing context. See the Appendix for a more detailed description ofthese congressional
attitudes.
Two sets of beliefs influence the outcome of congressional debates over missile
defense. The first set of beliefs discussed above and described in the Appendix section
concern the desirability—or danger—of deploying missile defenses. The second set of
beliefs are assertions concerning the technical, economic, and political feasibility of
constructing missile defense systems. Table 1 . 1 provides a summary of the important
38 For an example of the persistent argument against both theater and national missile defense see
Lauren Spain, "The Dream of Missile Defense. So Where's the Peace Dividend?," Bulletin ofAtomic
Scientists 51, no. 5 (September 1995): 49-50.
39These categories are adaptation of the categories described by Graham T. Allison, Albert
Camesale, and Joseph Nye, Jr., Hawks, Doves, and Owls (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985).
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strategic myths and Table 1 .2 lists the auxiliary assertions prevalent in the missile defense
debate. The efforts of key individuals to create or interpret events and images to legitimize
and popularize these beliefs and assertions is central to success or failure of any missile
defense initiative.
Table 1.1 Categories of Beliefs Concerning Missile Defense





Missile defenses enhance security by reducing the vulnerability of the
strategic arsenal, conventional forces, and the public.
Missile defense only enhance security if kept in an overall deterrence-
stabilizing context.
Missile defense erode security by promoting increased nuclear
competition, increasing spiral of tension, and bringing nations closer
to brink of nuclear extinction.
Table 1.2 Auxiliary Assertions Missile Defense40





Capacity to overcome technical difficulties associated with developing
missile defense; possibility for industrial spin-offs.
Capacity to meet financial costs associated with developing missile
defenses; possibility of lucrative industrial spin-offs.
Capacity to manage political problems associated with developing
missile defenses; impact on relations with other state's
—
particularly
the Soviet Union in the context of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
40 Auxiliary assertions concerning missile defenses are interestingly identical to those concerning
nuclear weapons. See Lavoy, Learning to Live with the Bomb, 92.
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E. MAKING MYTHS AND MAKING NEWS
Strategic myths are held and advanced by individuals. Congressional attitudes toward
missile defense are shaped by key players: the President and other executive officials,
congressional defense policy elites, and leaders of interest groups including both public and
corporate interest lobbies. Fostering support for their defense policy preferences requires
these political elites to frame issues in manner that creates a favorable climate of political
opinion toward their preferred policies.
Defense policy shifts reflect changes in the level and intensity of public opinion.41
Roger Davidson explains that "public attitudes—not only their direction, but also their
intensity—are undoubtably the most powerful engines propelling congressional action on
legislative issues."42 It is a mistake, however, to believe that democratic governments
respond to the public's whims. On the contrary, Murray Edelman notes in The Symbolic
Uses of Politics notes that the public does not analyze and study detailed information
concerning security issues but it "ignores these things until political actions and speeches
make them symbolically threatening or reassuring, and it then responds to the cues furnished
by the actions and speeches, not to directly knowledge of the facts."43 It is political action
that shapes popular and elite opinion, not the other way around. Therefore, myth makers
can—and do—manipulate public and elite opinion to influence defense policy outcomes.
41
Bartels, "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making," 457-473.
42 Roger H. Davidson, "Congress and the American People," in Congressional Politics, ed.
Christopher J. Deering (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1989), 308.
43 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses ofPolitics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1967),
172.
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To frame public policy, elites must exploit the dynamic relationship between the
media, the public, and Congress. The media is the lens through which elites communicate
with the public and each other. As one prominent political consultant recently noted, "if it
is not on television, it hardly matters."44 A democratic free press creates a critical nexus
between myth makers and the media. To maintain "objectivity" current journalistic practice
requires news organizations to feature expert authorities and compels reporters to search for
the "the ultimate spokesman" on any newsworthy topic.45 Competent myth makers are
always positioned to be considered policy experts. These entrepreneurial politicians stand
ready to seize any window of opportunity to perpetuate their beliefs by interpreting the
images and events surrounding a given policy initiative.
Myth making requires both a good sense of timing and a creative knack for framing
issues and events to generate favorable news coverage. Issues most likely to resonate are
easily described, have clearly defined sides, affect a large part of the public, and come with
compelling images. Sometimes great political leaders can arouse political consciousness with
speeches that generate vivid, emotion laden images. For example, Winston Churchill's "iron
curtain" is notable because it galvanized America's opposition to the emerging Soviet threat.
More often, a culmination of real world conditions and events will propel certain issues into
the media spotlight. Interpreting the associated images provides myth makers with a
powerful means of telling a story in a way that words alone cannot.
44 Roger Ailes, Bare Knuckles and Backroom (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 374.
45 Susan H. Miller, "News Coverage of Congress: The Search for the Ultimate Spokesman,'
Journalistic Quarterly 54 (Autumn 1977), 459-465.
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Images seem more convincing than words because people tend to believe what they
see.
46 But despite claims to the contrary, media images rarely speak for themselves.47
Images and events must be placed in the context of a larger story that explains associated
causes, effects, and relevance. Thus, the credible new frame comes with descriptive dialogue
that sets the scene, characterizes the actors, explains the plots and subplots, actively moves
the story to a climax and, most important, ends with a host of official experts that provide
the final, authoritative interpretation of the events.48 Positioned as authoritative experts,
myth makers can interpret images and events in ways that identify their pet policy
preferences as attractive solutions.
49
Not just any interpretation of images and events can become credible.50 As John
Kingdon points out "when a window opens because a policy is pressing, the alternatives
generated as solutions to the problem fare better if they also meet the test of political
46 Stephen Baker, Visual Persuasion (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961).
47 Charles Elder and Roger Cobb make this point forcefully: "Events and circumstances do not
speak for themselves. Whether they constitute a policy problem, or a particularly urgent one, depends on
the meaning attributed to them." Charles D. Elder and Roger W. Cobb, The Political Uses ofSymbols
(New York: Longman, 1983), 24.
48
For a complete description of the credible new frame see Philo C. Washburn, Broadcasting
Propaganda: International Radio Broadcasts and the Social Construction ofReality (Westport, Conn.:
Praeger, 1992).
49 Lavoy, Learning to Live with the Bomb, 96.
50 The discussion of myth making begs the larger question "What factors make certain media
images more believable than others." Social construction and media dependency theory address this
question. For the classic explanation of social construction theory see Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman,
The Social Construction ofReality (New York: Doubleday, 1966). The literature on media dependency
theory includes Hanna Adoni and Sherrill Mane, "Media and the Social Construction of Reality: Toward
an Integration of Theory and Research," Communications Research 1 1 (1984): 323-40; and Dan Nimmo
and James Combs, Mediated Political Realities (New York: Longman, 1990).
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acceptability."51 Political acceptability is function of the credibility of both the message and
the persuasiveness of the messenger.52 To become accepted, a myth must be consistent with
a pre-existing political culture. 53 For example, calls for unilateral disarmament and the
Strategic Defense Initiative were both simplistic solutions to the nuclear paradox. Reagan's
strategic vision was believable—at least temporarily—because of his personal aura and the
cultural consistency of the Strategic Defense Initiative; SDI tapped into America's deeply
held anti-communist and technological heritage by compelling the public and political elites
to imagine defeating the "evil empire" with American gadgetry that would "render nuclear
weapons impotent and obsolete."54
The success of one myth over another depends upon three sets of factors: (1) the
substantive content of the myth and its ability to be placed into a culturally consistent
context; (2) the political credibility and position of the individual myth makers; and (3) the
ability of myth makers to create or interpret media images that serve to legitimize and
popularize their strategic beliefs, increase the level or intensity of favorable public and elite
51 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.,
1984), 183.
52 See Richard M. Perloff, The Dynamics ofPersuasion (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, 1993); Anthony R. Patkanis and Eliot Aronson, Age ofPropaganda: Everyday Use and Abuse
ofPersuasion (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1992); and Robert B. Cialdina, Influence: The Psychology of
Persuasion (New York: Quill William Morrow, 1993).
53 Lavoy, Learning to Live with the Bomb, 48.
54 For a description of President Reagan's rhetorical impact on the arms debate see Kenneth A.
Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds., Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American
Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987). For a complete discussion of the role of myth making in the
early eighties debates over SDI and Nuclear Freeze see Chapter III.
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opinion regarding their initiatives, and thereby shape important political attitudes.55 This
study examines the role of these factors in shaping congressional attitudes toward missile
defense.
F. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The political story of American missile defense efforts unfolds chronologically.
Using the analytical framework described in the previous sections, this study examines four
divisive national debates over missile defense funding. Each chapter describes the missile
defense debate by highlighting the factors influencing the political environment surrounding
the debate. It outlines the position and beliefs ofkey individuals engaged in each stage of the
debate and describes efforts to manipulate powerful images to propagate their strategic
arguments. Finally, each chapter analyzes the success or failure of elites in framing the terms
of the debate to shape congressional attitudes toward their preferred policies.
Chapter II explores the "The Great ABM Debate" which occurred between 1967-
1970. It identifies the political forces that lead to the genesis of congressional assertiveness
on defense issues reflected in congressional opposition to the deployment of the Sentinel
ABM system. It explores the motivations underlying Secretary McNamara's announcement
to deploy the Sentinel ABM system and describes how key players manipulated powerful
images to turn public and congressional attitudes against the Sentinel initiative, forcing the
administration to abandon Sentinel—a multi-site ABM program—in favor of Safeguard a
very limited single site missile defense system.
55 See Lavoy, Learning to Live with the Bomb?, 76.
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Chapter III examines the individuals and images that drove the nuclear freeze
movement of the early 1980s. The chapter explains how President Reagan—the most
powerful myth maker of his day—recognized the freeze movement as a serious challenge to
his overall strategic efforts and executed a deliberate political strategy to undermine the
initiative. Manipulating the same images of nuclear devastation as did the nuclear freeze
movement, Reagan offered an even more politically salient approach to the nuclear problem:
The Strategic Defense Initiative. The political maneuvering surrounding SDI and the nuclear
freeze movement is a compelling example of how strategic myth making can frame
congressional attitudes toward missile defense.
Chapter IV examines the Patriot experience of the Gulf War. The debate over
Patriot's performance in Gulf was not grounded in concerns about the effectiveness or
necessity oftheater missile defenses in the post-Cold War international environment. Instead,
the argument was quickly framed in terms of the competing Cold War paradigms. Patriot's
political story is one full of savvy, irony, and manipulation. Despite considerable evidence
that its success was vastly oversold, Patriot's persona captured the American imagination,
empowered political elites, and dramatically influenced both the nature and level of missile
defense funding in the nineties. The Patriot debate illustrates that strategic myths and popular
images are still central to any debate over missile defenses.
Chapter V points to the implications of previous debates for future ABM
controversies. It outlines the political dynamics of the 1995 national missile defense (NMD)
controversy, explaining the factors that allowed the President to undermine the latest
RepublicanNMD proposal. The chapter explores congressional motives for bolstering Navy
21
missile defense funding and examines how congressional framing might complicate or
complement future Navy missile defense efforts. It ends by providing a framework for








Figure 1.1 Summary of General Argument
Figure 1.1 outlines my approach to examining the influences on congressional
attitudes toward defense issues. Congressional deference, parochialism, and policy
preferences all matter in determining the direction and scope ofUnited States defense efforts.
However, understanding the precise role of each of these lenses plays in the formulation of
specific defense policies is a separate challenge that scholars have not been able to address
completely. By examining the history ofthe congressional debate of missile defenses, this
study emphasizes how defense policy elites (myth makers) have consistently attempted to
manipulate powerful images, perpetuate their strategic beliefs (myths), shape congressional
attitudes toward missile defense, and shift the balance of congressional opinion in favor of
their desired policy options.
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II. THE GREAT ABM DEBATE
On 28 December 1995, President Clinton vetoed a 265 billion dollar defense
authorization bill citing his strong objection to provisions mandating deployment by the year
2003 of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system capable of defending all fifty states. 56
Twenty-five years after the end ofwhat was known as "the Great ABM Debate," the dispute
over the deploying ballistic missile defense systems has become a perennial issue of
American strategic discourse. The tangled web of political interests that embody the anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) debate was first spun in the congressional-executive battles of the
late 1960s. Discerning the future of missile defense must begin with an effort to untangle
that web and explore the issues that fueled the initial ABM debate.
In studying the 1995 NMD controversy, there are eerie echos of a previous debate.
Twenty-five years earlier, opponents squared off over viability and necessity of missile
defenses. Politicians debated whether missile defenses were destabilizing, inhibited
negotiations with the Soviets, were necessary to counter the Chinese missile threat, and were
technically feasible. These arguments were never resolved, nor are they likely to be now.
Disagreements in Congress or between Congress and the Executive are rarely precise nor are
the results explicit.
57 However, the convergence of forces that culminated in the Great ABM
Debate shattered the Cold War consensus on strategic issues and altered the relationship
56 Brian Green, "The Clash on National Missile Defense," Air Force Magazine (March 1996): 8.
57 John W. Finney, "A Historical Perspective," in Walter Stutzle, Bhupendra Jasani, and Regina
Cohen, ed., The ABM Debate: To Defend or Not to Defend? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987),
29.
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between the Congress and the Executive concerning defense policy. The implications of that
change include the emergence of congressional assertiveness on defense issues and the
polarization of conflicting unverified strategic beliefs among foreign policy elites that still
exists today.
This chapter emphasizes that myths and myth making were integral to that first ABM
debate. Section A describes the political environment that fueled the genesis of the Great
ABM Debate. Section B points outs the importance of political images in the Secretary
McNamara's announcement of the decision to deploy the Sentinel ABM systems in
September of 1967. Section C explains how the political actions of a few key individuals
mobilized public opposition and altered the climate of opinion surrounding the ABM debate.
Section D highlights how the President used his position to perpetuate the myth that missile
defense was a critical bargaining chip in negotiating with the Soviets.
A. GENESIS OF THE GREAT ABM DEBATE
During the first twenty years ofthe Cold War, the U.S. Congress anxiously reinforced
the programs and policies of the Executive on national security matters, particularly with
regard to nuclear strategy and arms control.58 The dangers of the Cold War prompted
Congress to forego its oversight responsibilities on most defense issues. Although different
schools of thought on arms control policy were reaching maturity, these differences did not
emerge in the public policy debate until the middle of the 1960s.
S8 Howard Stoffer, Congressional Defense Policy Making and the Arms Control Community
(Ann Arbor: University Microfilms Int., 1980), 1.
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The Vietnam War profoundly changed the congressional role in national security
policy.59 The war in Southeast Asia polarized the nation, increased the public awareness of
defense policy, and ended an era of relatively unquestioned congressional support for the
policies of the executive branch.
Issues once considered too sensitive for public consumption and debate moved
rapidly into the political arena. Persuasive politicians began to openly challenge the
President on defense issues and turned to think tanks, universities, scientists, and arms
control movements to help reinforce and perpetuate their strategic arguments.
The Great ABM Debate represented the first manifestation of this changing political
environment. The President's decision to build and deploy an ABM System in the late 1960's
was met by staunch, open opposition by some members of Congress such as Senator Albert
Gore, Sr. For three years from 1967 to 1970, Gore led a group of daring senators in
mounting an unprecedented challenge to a new weapons system. Supported by an
increasingly influential group of eminent scientists, civilian military experts, and public
interest lobbies who doubted the viability of the system and warned of its dangerous effect
on U.S.-Soviet relations, the senators contested every vote on the ABM issue. Despite the
fact that the system was pushed by influential members of Congress, requested by the
President, and heavily endorsed by the military, the senators almost won. Some argue they
did win because the United States has never fully deployed an anti-ballistic missile system.60
59 Robert A. Levine, Still The Arms Debate (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1990),
113.
60 Finney, "A Historical Perspective," 29.
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On the surface, the Great ABM Debate, like all political controversies, was fought
over philosophical differences about what constituted sound strategic policy for the United
States. Just beneath the surface, however, domestic political pressures fueled the
controversy. In the end, substantive policy arguments proved only as important as the ability
ofkey political elites to manipulate powerful images to reinforce their arguments, change the
climate of opinion, and alter political attitudes toward missile defense.
B. MCNAMARA'S DILEMMA
The ABM debate burst into the open on 18 September 1967, when Defense Secretary
Robert S. McNamara announced the President's decision to deploy the Sentinel ABM system
in a speech titled "The Dynamics ofNuclear Strategy.'* 1 For years McNamara had argued
that deploying an ABM system would be "wasteful and ineffective."62 Most of the speech
reinforced this theme, emphasizing the dangers of deploying defenses:
Any present or foreseeable ABM system can rather obviously be defeated by
an enemy simply sending more offensive warheads, or dummy warheads,
than there are defensive missile capable of disposing of them. This would
trigger a senseless spiral upward of nuclear arms.63
By the time McNamara began to discuss American responses to the Chinese missile
threat, the audience must have been convinced that the United States was not about to deploy
61 Robert S. NcNamara, "The Dynamics ofNuclear Strategy," U.S. Department ofDefense News
Release No. 868-67. Address by Honorable Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense Before The
United Press International Editors and Publishers, San Francisco, California, September, 18, 1967, 24.
62 For a discussion of McNamara' s belief that missile defenses are "wasteful and ineffective," see
Stoffer, Congressional Defense Policy, 1 19.
63 Finney "A Historical Perspective," 32.
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any kind of ballistic missile defense. To the surprise of the audience, McNamara in a
stunning reversal announced the deployment of the Sentinel ABM system—a thin anti-
missile defense to guard against the emerging Chinese missile threat.64 He explained that the
system would be relatively inexpensive and technically capable of countering a limited
missile attack or an accidental launch.65 McNamara defended the deployment, charging that
a missile-equipped China might "become so incautious as to attempt a nuclear attack on the
United States."66 He concluded that "there are marginal grounds for concluding that a light
deployment of U.S. ABMs against this possibility is prudent.'*7 But McNamara warned that
"the danger in deploying this light and reliable Chinese-oriented ABM system is going to be
the that pressure will develop to expand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented ABM system."68
McNamara' s support of Sentinel was the most unenthusiastic and reluctant
endorsement by a defense secretary of any new weapons system since the end of the second
world war. The speech constituted an amazing contradiction in logic. Why was an assured
destruction capability sufficient to deter Moscow but not Beijing? Ironically, the speech that
was supposed to launch America's first realistic ABM program also provided critics with the
rhetorical firepower to oppose it.
64 NcNamara, "The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy," 1.








In retrospect, the contradictions in "The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy" can be
explained by examining the domestic political climate surrounding the announcement. A
recently declassified memorandum entitled "Dealing with the ABM Problem" reveals the
primary motivation underlying the Sentinel decision: "a need to deal with the ABM problem
in a positive way during the forthcoming Congress."69 Some very influential Senators and
Congressmen—Rivers, Stenis, Thurmond, Jackson, and Russell, among others—were
publicly championing ABM deployment. Both the detonation of the Chinese H-bomb in
June and Chinese missile testing in July of 1966, gave them an opportunity to exert
enormous pressure on the Administration to deploy missile defenses. House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) Chairman Mendel Rivers openly warned that the President might be
held personally responsible for "leaving the American public defenseless."70 Reinforcing this
position, the service chiefs testified before Congress giving their unanimous support for
deploying a missile defense.
Despite the political pressure, McNamara continued his staunch opposition to ABM
deployment. In a 9 January 1967 memorandum written to the President he reiterated his
opposition stating "that Mr. Vance and I recommend against [ABM] deployment."71
McNamara preparing the President on his upcoming meeting with HASC Chairmen, advised
the Lyndon Johnson to warn Mendel Rivers "that we are in the midst of a war, and nothing
69 Foy D. Kohler, "Dealing with the ABM Problem," Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense,
11 January 1967, declassified 12-11-89.
70 Morton Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the
Johnson Administration," World Politics 25 (October 1972): 62.
71 Robert McNamara, "Memorandum for the President," 9 January 1967, declassified 6-22-84.
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could be more divisive and harmful to our country than to have a public wrangle between the
Chairmen of the House Armed Services Committee and the President."72
To complicate matters for President Johnson, Governor Ronald Reagan of California
and Republican nominee Richard Nixon were making noises about raising the "ABM gap"
as issue in the 1968 Presidential election. Nixon warned that failure to deploy ABM was "a
deadly boomerang."73 He was referring to President Johnson's previous role as an architect
of the "bomber gap" and "missile gap" issues which had "bedeviled the Republicans years
before."74
Under pressure from Congress and the JCS and conscious ofthe political saliency of
perceived defense gaps, Johnson grew impatient with his Secretary of Defense. With their
relationship already strained over Vietnam, Johnson could no longer defer to McNamara on
such an important and increasingly controversial issue. Johnson ordered McNamara to alter
his original draft to include support for limited ABM deployments. 75
McNamara' s heart was not in the Sentinel deployment. A quintessential Owl,
McNamara opposed missile defenses on principle. As early as December 1966, however,
he had acknowledged the terrible political dilemma facing the President.76 He understood
72 McNamara, "Memorandum to the President," 9 January 1967.
73
Finney, "A Historical Perspective," 33.
74
Ibid.
75 Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense, 161.
76 Notes on meeting with the President in Austin, Texas, December 6, 1966 with Secretary
NcNamara and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Originally Top Secret Eyes Only For The President, Declassified 1-
3-90. LBJ Library E.O 12356, Sec. 3-4.
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that it "was extremely hard to make a case for a policy which appeared to deny protection to
our people" and hinted that his fallback position would be to deploy limited defenses to
protect against a Chinese ICBM capability.77
Preserving the strategic balance with the Soviets was McNamara's paramount
consideration. To him, the "Chinese threat" was a sideshow. Realizing that the President
could no longer resist the mounting political pressure to deploy ABMs, McNamara crafted
the Sentinel initiative in terms of the Chinese threat to alleviate domestic political pressure
without undermining the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.
McNamara's hand-written changes to the "Dealing with the ABM Problem"
memorandum reflect his recognition that the Sentinel decision had become unavoidable. The
text originally had recommended that the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of State
should "avoid references to ABM."78 McNamara altered the memo to read "avoid
'enthusiastic' references."79 This might explain his unenthusiastic endorsement of Sentinel.
Twenty years later he would admit that the Sentinel announcement was purely political:
The only reason it [the Sentinel announcement] was in there was to recognize
the political pressure and the fact that the Congress had authorized such a
system, appropriated for it, and was pushing unmercifully to deploy.80
In 1967 the Sentinel deployment passed the Congress by a wide margin. Despite
McNamara's private opposition, ABM advocates were successful in pressuring the President
"Ibid.
78




"Visions of Star Wars: A NOVA/Frontline Special Report," No. 5008 (Boston: WGBH
Foundation, 1986), 13.
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to deploy Sentinel because they fostered a favorable political climate of opinion toward
ABM. Images of the "Chinese missile threat" and an "ABM gap" were decisive in
reinforcing their arguments in favor of Sentinel. While ABM opponents staunchly opposed
the deployment, they lacked salient images to reinforce their arguments. Anti-ABM voices
seemed like a whisper beneath the choir of voices calling for immediate ABM deployments.
The ABM debate, however, was far from over. In the next year, the voices of anti-
ABM forces would grow louder as they seized opportunities to manipulate powerful images
of their own. Although a 1967 poll clearly emphasized an attitude of "public indifference"
toward ABM deployment, before the debate was over it would touch towns and cities across
America.
C. NOT IN MY BACKYARD!
Toward the end of the Johnson Administration, the U.S. Army announced the first
ten locations of Sentinel ABM bases. The locations were selected to provide "key
geographic and strategic coverage"for the whole nation.81 Although the 400-mile range of
the Sentinel system allowed basing well outside America's metropolitan areas, the Army
selected eight major cities as ABM bases. Driving the decision to select heavily populated
areas was the Army's desire to enlarge the Sentinel system to protect against a heavy Soviet
attack. As fate and a lack of political sensitivity would have it, the Army selected Chicago
and Seattle—hot beds of scientific activism—as the initial Sentinel bases. The Doves were
handed a key opportunity to take a stand against ABM deployment.
81
Staffer, Congressional Defense Policy, 130.
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Peace activists and committees of scientists rapidly mobilized to organize rallies,
town meetings, and protests to demonstrate against Sentinel. Organized opposition to
Sentinel began in these large cities and then quickly spread to other potential basing
locations. Local leaders fueled the perception that ABM accidents could pose a serious
hazard to the public and argued that the proximity of a Sentinel base to a city would actually
increased its probability ofbeing attacked. Simultaneously, several Congress members took
the floor to point out that Sentinel deployments would be unacceptable to the their
constituents. To exacerbate public anxieties, ABM opponents raised concerns over
Sentinel's effect on property values, the character of the neighborhood, insurance rates, and
even television reception. Using their strong media connections, myth makers nurtured
public fears until they exploded in open dissent.
Towns and counties surrounding Chicago began passing resolutions forbidding
Sentinel deployment. In the midst of a political fire storm, the Army decided to break its
policy of silence by sending its representatives to local meetings to try to alleviate public
fears. In Waukegan, the Army sent its top team of John Foster, the director of Defense
Research and Engineering, and General Alfred Starbird, the program manager for the
Sentinel system. The meeting was attended by several prominent local scientists who
opposed ABM. During the meeting, John Erskine, an Argonne National Laboratories
scientist, quietly distributed hundred of pamphlets detailing the horrid devastation that could
result from the accidental explosion of "just one warhead at the ABM site."82 Foster and
Starbird's technical discussion of Sentinel did little to calm public fears. Instead of directly
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addressing the issue of accidental detonation, the military experts cautiously dodged the
issue. After the meeting Erskine, supported by other activists, addressed the public and the
media. He repeatedly emphasized the issue of accidental explosion declaring that he would
have "no missiles in my backyard."83
To the surprise ofmany activists, the issue of"no missiles in my backyard" resonated
with the public and became the cornerstone of opposition to Sentinel. Encouraged by
scientists, leaders of the ABM opposition had set out to educate the public on the serious
dangers of the nuclear arms race. At first, they feared that the "no missiles in my backyard"
slogan would cloud the real issues and be regarded as pure demagogy by the national media.
But once the images of accidental nuclear explosion were unleashed on the American people,
discussions of nuclear doctrine and strategy became futile and unnecessary for Sentinel's
opponents.
Congressmen and Senators from the effected areas immediately felt the brunt of
constituency outrage. Senate minority leader, Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.) received almost a
thousand letters a week from constituents opposing Sentinel. 84 Dirksen abandoned his
staunch support for Sentinel and demanded a congressional review of Sentinel funding.
After meeting with Washington's anti-ABM coalition, Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-Wa.),
possibly the strongest ABM supporter in the Senate, pressured the Army to move an ABM
site out of Seattle. 85 The Army relocated the site to Bainbridge Island in Pudget Sound. But
83






Bainbridge Island's Representative, Thomas Kelly (R-Wa.), another previous ABM
supporter, immediately protested the move, forcing the Army to search for another location. 86
The strong reaction to Sentinel basing in many areas of the country represents the
connection between images and the political salience of an issue. Compelling the public to
imagine the nuclear devastation of their homes and communities evokes strong emotions.
Local opposition to missile defenses was a direct result of the myth maker's use of vivid
images to connect adverse nuclear consequences with missile defense deployments . Furious
local protest at nearly every potential ABM base prompted newly elected President Nixon
to halt Sentinel deployment pending further review. Several weeks later, he announced that
all ABM sites would be moved from cities to remote locations.
On 14 March 1969, the President canceled the Sentinel program and replaced it with
a new missile defense initiative called Safeguard. 87 The new ABM system would have
different priorities. Instead of protecting American cities against a light Chinese nuclear
attack, Safeguard "would protect America's deterrent" that was "becoming increasingly
vulnerable" to Soviet attack. 88 Protecting American cities against the Chinese threat or an
accidental launch would be a secondary mission. Although Safeguard was almost identical
to Sentinel in capabilities and cost, it had an increasingly less demanding defensive mission
of protecting missile silos in order to reinforce Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).
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Reorienting ABM priorities was a politically savvy move. By removing ABM sites
from suburban locations, Nixon defused the grass-roots protest that was engulfing Congress.
In the wake of America's post-Sputnik paranoia, it was also easier to sell an anti-Soviet
system than one designed to counter a tenuous Chinese missile threat. Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird's statements epitomized the shift in strategic debate. "The Russians are going
after our missiles," he warned, "and they are going for a first strike capability. There is no
question about that."89
Although the administration had quieted public outrage over ABM, they
underestimated the enthusiasm some Senators and scientific activists had for defeating the
system. Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
questioned Laird's motives and accused him of "using a technique of fear to sell the ABM
program."90 More important, the critics argued that the Sentinel (renamed Safeguard) system
was designed for area vice point defenses; its technical suitability for protecting missile fields
was dubious. Congressional critics immediately seized the issue. For weeks the Senate was
embroiled in technical hearings. Figure 2-1 is Paul Conrad cartoon that depicts Senators
erupting like a "Multiple Warhead" through the Capitol dome.
Prior to the 1969 ABM Debate, independent scientists rarely testified before the
military committees of Congress. The exception had been the secret hearing of the late
1940s concerning development of the hydrogen bomb. Only in 1954—after the transcript
of the hearings was declassified—did the public find out the full scope of the scientific




controversy. A barrage of letters from peace organizations and scientists requesting a hearing
on ABM convinced the military committees to allow opposition witnesses to testify.
Figure 2-1: "Multiple Warhead." (Copyright Paul Conrad and Los
Angeles Times, 1969; reprinted with permission)
Scientists played a crucial role in the 1969 ABM debate by forcing a public
discussion of the issues. Seventy percent ofthe sixty scientists that testified before Congress
opposed the Safeguard system.91 It is uncertain whether the public would have become
aware of pervasive anti-ABM sentiment among scientists, including the President's Science
91
Staffer, Congressional Defense Policy, 188.
36
Advisory Committee, if the efforts by peace organizations and scientists to open
congressional hearings had not been successful. The scientists' auxiliary assertions
concerning technical and economic feasibility served to reinforce the strategic myth that
missile defenses might bring nuclear devastation home to America's backyards.
On 1 August 1968, the funding of the deployment of Sentinel had passed the Senate
by a 46 to 27 margin.92 One year and five days later, after the political firestorm, Safeguard
would come extremely close to defeat.
The Safeguard debate centered around the Cooper-Hart Amendment, a provision that
would prohibit Safeguard deployment but allow continued missile defense research and
development. Leading the charge for the Administration was Senator Barry Goldwater (R-
Ariz.) and Senator John Tower (R-Tx.). Goldwater criticized ABM opponents for
"proposing self full-filling prophesies by arguing that since the land-based deterrent missile
force was vulnerable it should not be defended."93 Tower rejected anti-ABM scientists
testimony as inconsistent, claiming that "all missiles, radars, and other components had been
built and tested for the Safeguard ABM system."94
The week before the vote, the opposition launched a series of full-page newspaper
ads and a massive grass-roots letter writing campaign.95 These efforts emphasized the
"public danger" of deploying missile defenses. Compounding the Administration's ABM
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problem was the bipartisan nature of the opposition, which included several respected
Republican Senators including Cooper, Aiken, Javits, and Smith.
The vote count was so close that suspense hung on every Senator's announcement.
In the final round of debates, Senator Albert Gore, Sr. (D-Tn.) presented a "mountain of
evidence" suggesting that Safeguard was "unsuitable for hard point defenses."96 At the last
minute Senator Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.) acknowledged his opposition to Safeguard.97
On the eve of the vote, ABM opponents concluded that they had at least 50 of the 51 votes
required to prevent Safeguard's deployment.98
On 6 August 1969, Senator Smith (R-Me.) introduced an amendment barring funding
for Safeguard but allowing other BMD research. The provision was defeated 50-5 1.99
Although it was unnecessary, Vice President Agnew cast the deciding vote for symbolic
reasons. In an ironic twist, the next day Smith voted against the Cooper-Hart amendment
because it permitted continued ABM research and development which she opposed. 100 The
amendment was defeated 49-51.
Never before had a President's proposal to fund a major weapons system come so
close to defeat. The Safeguard votes were symbolic of a brewing congressional rebellion
against the unquestioned executive dominance of security policy. Congress put the Executive
96 John W. Finney, "Senate Panel, with Film and Reports, Rests Case Against ABM," New York
Times, 31 July 1969,8.
97 Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense, 219.
98
Ibid. According to Senate rules a tie vote defeats an amendment.
99 Weaver, "Nixon Missile Plan Wins in Senate ," 22.
100 Adams, 220.
38
on notice that the defense budgets would be subjected to careful scrutiny in the future. The
ABM debate marked the end of complete executive branch control of national security
affairs. Moreover, auxiliary assertions about the economic and technical feasibility of
missile defenses became increasingly central to reinforcing the argument that missile
defenses are dangerous and destabilizing, a trend that continues in recent ABM debates.
D. A BARGAINING CHIP
In 1970, ABM opponents made a final effort to undermine the deployment of
Safeguard. Absent the publicity of the 1969 controversy, the anti-ABM caucus staunchly
opposed the an administration request to expand Safeguard from two to four sites. Opponents
recycled the arguments that Safeguard was technically unreliable and destabilizing. 101
Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) emerged as the point man for the administration on
ABM. Dole discounted the opposition's arguments and questioned the wisdom of
congressional intervention in Presidential policies:
He [Nixon] is winding down the war in Southeast Asia. We do have a cease-
fire in the Middle East. We are making some progress at the SALT talks.
Why should we in Congress, in view of these accomplishments, seek to
impose our judgement on the country when it come to ABM or some other
weapons system? 102
Safeguard advocates claimed the Administration's aggressive ABM deployment was a
critical "bargaining chip" in negotiations with the Soviets. Senator Jackson claimed that
101
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"there is virtual unanimity by the Government and the U.S. arms negotiating team on the
need to maintain momentum on ABM for further progress at the arms talks." 103
Suspecting another close vote, President Nixon ordered Ambassador Gerald Smith,
head of the U.S. delegation to the SALT talks, to send a letter to wavering and uncommitted
Senators.
104 Although Smith denied any knowledge ofthe pending amendments, he expressed
concern that the "static condition" ofABM systems could undermine the negotiations. 105
The 1970 Cooper-Hart Amendment failed by a 47-52 vote, a three vote margin of approval
for Safeguard. Several Senators openly acknowledged that Smith's telegram was the decisive
factor in changing their vote.
The Great ABM Debate was over. The President's position as the nation's chief
negotiator gave him considerable leverage to offer incentives, twist arms, and frame the
terms of the debate to achieve his policy goals. For the true believers in missile defense, the
victory proved hollow because strategic defenses would never be completely deployed.
Emphasizing the "Russian threat" gave the President his "bargaining chip" at the
negotiating table. But arguing that missile defenses were necessary to reinforce mutually
assured destruction unwittingly undermined ABM deployments by establishing the
preeminence of the doctrine of strategic stability. In the early seventies, a temporary
consensus emerged that arms control—not missile defenses—would be the best means of
safeguarding strategic stability. Nixon's negotiation of the SALT and ABM treaties
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104
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submerged the missile defense issue in an ocean of detente. It would not surface again until
President Reagan's famous call to "render nuclear warheads impotent and obsolete."
G. MYTHS, IMAGES, AND THE GREAT ABM DEBATE
The convergence of forces that culminated in "The Great ABM Debate" marked a
shift in the relationship between the Congress and the Executive. Underlying the Great ABM
Debate were deeply held disparate convictions concerning the strategic utility of missile
defenses; a balance of strategic myths had emerged among U.S. foreign policy elites. Today,
the assertive congressional oversight of strategic issues reflects the same conflicting
arguments about the relationship between nuclear weapons, missile defenses, and security
that had fueled the initial ABM debate.
During the "Great ABM Debate," a lack of concrete evidence to support their
assertions drove the key players to seize powerful images to reinforce their strategic
arguments. The President, executive officials, congressional defense policy elites, and
interest group leaders all tried to shape congressional attitudes. From the concerns about a
perceived "ABM Gap" that drove the Sentinel decision, to portrayal of nuclear devastation
in America's backyards, to the demand for a bargaining chip to thwart the Soviets, political
imagery proved decisive in every phase of the debate.
The "Great ABM Debate" highlighted the preeminence of Presidential myth making.
Toward the end of the debate, President Nixon effectively used his position to shape
congressional attitudes. Nixon and other key missile defense advocates tried to exploit
public fears that "the Russians were coming" to reinforce their arguments for missile
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defenses. Moreover, the administration effectively manipulated the status of arms control
negotiations to win congressional battles by creating the perception that missile defenses
were a critical bargaining chip in delicate negotiations with the Soviets. Defeating the
President on matters of national defense is difficult and rare. Despite the convergence of a
conglomerate of powerful interests, the Executive—through force of political power and
position—won every vote during the ABM debate. The opposition, however, was often
successful without actually defeating the President on the floors of Congress.
Through vivid, emotion-laden images, ABM opponents were able to disperse the
cloud of public indifference on defense issues. Congressional and interest group leaders
mobilized political movements to create the perception of intense public awareness of
strategic issues. Exploiting images of nuclear devastation, missile defense opponents fueled
the "no missiles in my backyard" argument that enabled citizens to identify with the hazards
and inconveniences ofthe Sentinel program. Presidents Johnson and Nixon failed to address
these public anxieties, allowing other political elites to frame the missile defense issue in a
negative political context. As a result, the Nixon Administration was forced to cancel the
Sentinel and the margin of congressional opinion favoring any type of missile defenses was
diminished substantially.
The ABM debate illustrated that a handful of influential individuals can manipulate
powerful images to frame the term of the debate and perpetuate their own strategic beliefs
to facilitate noticeable shifts in the nation's defense policy. After the ABM debate, the
balance of strategic myths endured. The next national debate over nuclear strategy would
be even more divisive, and myth making would be integral to its outcome.
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III. THE NUCLEAR FREEZE AND SDI
Ronald Wilson Reagan—arguably the most hawkish President of the post-War
era—was elected by an overwhelming margin in November of 1 980. During the campaign,
Reagan likened arms control to appeasement and portrayed President Carter as "weak" in his
handling of U.S-Soviet relations—a problem he pledged to correct, if elected. Upon
inauguration, Reagan implemented his anti-Soviet defense policies. Less than two years
later, on June 12, 1982, approximately one million protestors marched in New York City in
a show of opposition to Reagan's nuclear policies. 106 In the largest anti-nuclear
demonstration in U.S. history, protestors demanded an immediate bilateral freeze on the
testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons. 107 For well over a decade, national
polls had consistently indicated that a majority of the electorate favored arms control. 108 But
the public's nuclear anxieties had generally remained politically dormant. 109 In the early
eighties, America's nuclear anxiety burst into widespread political action.
Throughout the seventies, the residue from 1960s anti-war movement offered the
organizational potential for a widespread social movement. 110 But the political opportunity
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for social mobilization did not come until a series of events—the Iran hostage crisis, the
Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan, Three Mile Island, and the Reagan administration's bellicose
anti-Soviet rhetoric—aroused public fear of the dangers of nuclear technology and war.
Leftist elites seized this political opportunity to transform the potential for social
mobilization into political action. 1 " Nurturing the public's fear of nuclear war, peace
activists cultivated the nuclear freeze as a unifying concept to mobilize a wide array of
organizations and individuals under a single banner. The movement quickly gathered
momentum. In less than two years, the Freeze Campaign moved from the fringes of political
legitimacy to the halls of Congress, claiming substantial victories through congressional
resolutions and voter referendums. 112 But as David Meyer points out, "despite the
proliferation of anti-nuclear activities during Reagan's first term, the freeze movement
suddenly faded from the public eye with equally surprising alacrity."113 To the dismay of the
freeze activists, President Reagan was reelected by a huge margin and his defense program
remained largely intact.
To understand the volatile history of the freeze movement—both its rise and
decline—one must explore of how key individuals manipulated powerful images to
legitimize and popularize their strategic arguments surrounding the freeze proposal.
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Perpetuating images ofnuclear holocaust, activists capitalized on public anxieties to generate
broad support for the freeze proposal. The freeze movement quickly came to be seen as an
expression of opposition to the newly elected President's defense policies." 4
In response, President Reagan crafted his announcement of the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) to alleviate the public fears that were driving the opposition to his nuclear
program. Reagan compelled the public to imagine a world where strategic defenses offered
the hope "that our children and grandchildren could live in a world free ofthe constant threat
of nuclear war." 115 SDI had powerful appeal, because unlike the freeze, it captured the
American ethos of optimism, self-reliance, technical innovation, and manifest destiny. 116
Thus, the demise of the nuclear freeze movement was not a political accident. It was the
conscious effort of the most savvy politician to occupy the White House since Franklin D.
Roosevelt. 117
This chapter examines the role of myth makers and myth making in the nuclear
debate of early 1980s. Section A examines the origins and imagery of the freeze movement.
Section B explains how freeze leaders manipulated the language and symbolism of the freeze
movement to garner congressional support for their preferred policies. Section C examines
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the motivations underlying President Reagan's decision to pursue the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) and how his effective use of political imagery served to neutralize the freeze
movement. Section D draws lessons from the freeze and SDI initiatives to suggest
implications for future ABM debates.
A. ORIGINS OF THE FREEZE MOVEMENT
Most political scientists attribute credit for the rapid growth of the nuclear freeze
movement directly to the election of Ronald Reagan: 118
What Ronald Reagan did, that no previous president had done, was to rip off
the physic bandage that covers public fears and anxieties over nuclear
weapons. Americans, simply put, do not like to dwell on the subject of
nuclear war, and they become skittish when their leaders talk about it. 119
The Reagan administration's aggressive, belligerent tone and seemingly casual references
to nuclear weapons employment clearly provided fuel for the nuclear freeze movement. The
foundation of the movement, however, was laid well prior to Reagan's election. Reagan's
rhetoric simply served to exacerbate public concerns about nuclear war that had already been
deliberately cultivated by liberal elites in organized peace movements, Congress, and the
media. After the demise of the Freeze Campaign, top movement leaders would accuse
President Reagan of "manipulating the public's anti-nuclear sentiments to confuse and
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obfuscate the substantive issues." 120 What they fail to admit is that they also employed
similar tactics to generate public support for the freeze proposal.
The nuclear freeze movement was built on the foundation of previous protest
movements. After the Vietnam War, most protest movements failed to garner much
attention, with one exception, the anti-nuclear power movement. In 1971, the Union for
Concerned Scientists (UCS), a group of scientists formed to oppose nuclear weapons and
anti-ballistic missile deployments, began to focus on the safety of nuclear power reactors.
They released a report claiming that the Atomic Energy Commission's safety program was
seriously flawed and that reactor protection systems were inadequate to prevent a nuclear
meltdown. 121 Using this information, Ralph Nadar organized his national anti-nuclear
campaign, Critical Mass, which took to protesting at various nuclear power plants. Critical
Mass enjoyed only modest public support until an accident at Three Mile Island nuclear
power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania captured the media spotlight, giving the
movement added momentum and much greater popular support. By coincidence, Jane
Fonda's anti-nuclear protest film The China Syndrome, which depicted the dangers of
nuclear power, was released almost simultaneously. The movie only added to public
anxieties.
Capitalizing on the anti-nuclear power momentum created by the Three Mile Island
accident, the UCS and other peace activist moved to focus the public imagination on the
dangers of nuclear war. The Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), for example,
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developed a national campaign that distributed lectures and films describing the hypothetical
medical consequences of exploding a one megaton bomb over a typical American city. 122
Movement leaders credit PSR's efforts as laying the essential groundwork for the Freeze
Campaign. Activists also began to articulate a linkage between nuclear power and nuclear
weapons, making tenuous claims. For example, they stated:
Nuclear power and nuclear weapons are two sides of the same coin. They
both give off the same radioactive poisons, generate the same deadly waste
. . . and both threaten catastrophic destruction. The people who brought you
Hiroshima now bring us Harrisburg. 123
Henry Kendall—a founder of the UCS—admitted that "the dangers of nuclear power
are small compared with nuclear war." 124 But influenced by polls showing widespread public
ignorance about nuclear issues, 125 peace activists continued to use images of mushroom
clouds over nuclear power plants to incite public fears. Despite the obvious distortion of
scientific facts, the idea that nuclear power plants could achieve the "critical mass" necessary
for an atomic explosion linked the anti-nuclear weapons and anti-nuclear power movements
both organizationally and in the minds ofthe public. The image of a nuclear meltdown right
in their backyards enabled people to connect with hazards and inconveniences of nuclear
technology.
In the spring of 1979, approximately 100,000 anti-nuclear protesters marched on
Washington, capturing the media spotlight. Peace activists, frequently cited as nuclear
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experts by the media, vividly described the devastating effects of nuclear accidents and
explosions. 126 During the early eighties, these efforts succeeded in fueling an anti-nuclear
media frenzy. Mainstream news stories and fictional accounts began to perpetuate anti-
nuclear themes. Media coverage of nuclear issues increased sharply, remaining unusually
high through the end of 1983. 127 Between 1980 and 1983, The New York Times and CBS,
for example, both had over a ten-fold increase in nuclear related stories. 128 The Times anti-
nuclear focus peaked at more than 100 stories a month in the summer of 1982.
Books like Jonathon Schell's horrific description of nuclear holocaust, The Fate of
Earth, and Roger Molander's Nuclear War, What's In It For You? became best sellers. The
American Medical Association passed a resolution compelling doctors to inform their
patients of the dangers of nuclear war. 129 The political landscape was throughly groomed for
a disarmament push.
Underlying these events, the political entrepreneurship and organizational capability
of a single individual focused the movement's energy on a common policy initiative. While
peace activists were generally successfully in stoking nuclear fears, they failed to offer the
public a clear policy prescription. One activist explained, "people were really scared out of
their pants by our presentation and saying 'What can we do?'"130 Randall Fosberg, a defense
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analyst and the Director of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, stood ready
to provide the answer.
Fosberg, with her elite education and background, recognized early the potential for
a mass movement calling for changes in U.S. nuclear policy. 131 Intrigued by Senator Mark
Hatfield's (R-OR) proposals to amend the SALT II treaty to include a bilateral freeze of
nuclear weapons, she saw the freeze proposal as the ultimate vehicle to mobilize and unify
existing anti-nuclear groups.
132
In December 1979, Fosberg issued her Call to Halt the
Nuclear Arms to 600 activists at the Mobilization for Survival's annual convention. She
called for all activists to rally around the bilateral freeze on the production, testing, and
deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.
The freeze proposal caught on rapidly. During the 1980 election cycle, Randy
Kehler, a prominent Vietnam War protestor, succeeded in getting a freeze proposal on the
ballot in three western Massachusetts voting districts. The initiatives all passed with more
than a fifty percent margin, giving Fosberg and other movement leaders confidence in the
political salience of the issue. 133 For the movement to succeed nationally, however, Fosberg
believed that it had to appeal "to the majority ofmiddle class, middle-of-the-road citizens." 134
That meant exploiting the activist infrastructure to form a majority movement while resisting
the wider anti-imperialist, antiracist, antisexist, anti-interventionist, and pro-Soviet agendas
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ofmany ofthe participating groups. 135 As she explained, "I was very concerned that the idea
should not be co-opted and sort of diminished by the more radical peace groups with whom
I was working and relying on."136
In March of 1981, at the First National Strategy Conference of the Freeze Campaign,
Fosberg fought hard to keep the movement a single issue, moderate campaign. She made it
clear that it would be her way or the highway.137 While a few groups dropped out of the
movement, Fosberg succeeded in convincing the majority of the activists to embrace her
simplistic message and to help foster the "heartland image" needed to insure broad middle
class appeal. 138 The Conference adopted Fosberg' s strategy of generating popular pressure
to force lawmakers to "adopt the freeze as a national policy objective." 139
B. THE NUCLEAR FREEZE BECOMES A NATIONAL MOVEMENT
Assisted by Reagan administration rhetoric and the media, the Freeze Campaign fed
on the widespread fear of nuclear war. Building on their techniques of "whipping audiences
into a frenzied anger" by describing nuclear "bombing runs" on the local towns and cities,
activists began ending their speeches with calls for political action to support the freeze. 140
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In April of 1982, the Freeze Campaign gained national prominence attracting widespread
media coverage during Ground Zero Week. Reporters covering the anti-nuclear events
claimed that "over one million Americans, in more than 600 cities and 350 college campuses,
attended seminars, watched films, and flocked to rallies." 141 After the event, opinion polls
showed that more than seventy percent of the American people supported the freeze. 142
Senators Edward Kennedy and Mark Hatfield recognized early that "the sleeping
giant of public opinion had awakened." 143 They effectively captured the language and
symbolism of the freeze movement in their book Freeze! How you Can Prevent Nuclear
War. In conjunction with Congressman Edward Markey, Kennedy and Hatfield introduced
a joint Freeze Resolution in the House and Senate claiming that "it is time to take the first
decisive step back from the brink." 144 By the time anti-nuclear protestors gathered in New
York for their June 12, 1982, demonstration, Kennedy had given the Freeze Campaign
mainstream political legitimacy, enlisting the support of 169 U.S. Representatives and 25
Senators. 145 Randall Fosberg exalted "we've done it. The nuclear freeze campaign has
mobilized the biggest peacetime movement in United States history." 146
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As the freeze gathered momentum in public opinion polls and in Congress, it was
perceived as a reflection of widespread public dissatisfaction with the Reagan defense
program. The White House began to fear that the freeze movement would spill over into
congressional debates over its strategic modernization effort. Officials were particularly
troubled by the political plight of the MX missile and B-l bomber. 147 David Gergen, White
House communications director at the time, acknowledged that "there was a widespread view
in the Administration that the freeze was a dagger pointed at the heart of the Administration's
defense program." 148 At one National Security Council meeting, Reagan's Chief of Staff
Howard Baker spoke frankly about the freeze: "we've got a domestic political problem . .
.
we need a substantive idea of our own." 149 Thus, Reagan officials began to try and "find a
way to outflank the freeze." 150 The answer, however, came directly from the President
himself.
C. THE ORIGINS OF SDI
Reagan first became inspired by the idea of missile defense during his term as
Governor of California. In 1967, he visited Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories
where scientist Edward Teller—the inventor of the hydrogen bomb—had acquainted
147 Donald R. Baucom, The Origins ofSDI 1944-1983 (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas
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President Reagan with the implications of missile defense research. 151 At the end ofthe visit,
Reagan commented that history had shown that the "sword always invites the shield." 152
Shortly after his visit to Livermore, Reagan's warning of an "ABM gap" contributed to the
political pressure that compelled the Johnson administration to announce deployment of the
Sentinel ABM system. 153
By the time he prepared to run for President in 1980, Reagan had developed a deep
enmity for the doctrine ofmutually assured destruction (MAD). He likened MAD to "having
two westerners standing in a saloon aiming their guns at each other's heads
—
permanently.
There had to be better way."154After being told during a 1979 visit to North American Air
Defense Command (NORAD), that the United States military was incapable of stopping a
single Soviet missile from striking an American city, Reagan toyed with making strategic
defense an issue in his 1980 campaign. Fearing such a move might constitute political
suicide, Reagan's advisors talked him out of it. 155
Ronald Reagan was a masterful politician with a keen sense of timing. He was
convinced that the United States should field a defense against missile attacks well prior to
his inauguration, yet his Strategic Defense Initiative did not come until after two full years
ISI Baucom, Origins ofSDI, 129.
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in office. Despite his belief in missile defenses, he chose to bide his time as he pressed for
the strategic modernization ofAmerica's nuclear forces. In the end, political necessity would
drive the timing of his SDI announcement.
D. IMPOTENT AND OBSOLETE: REAGAN NEUTRALIZES THE FREEZE
Scholars underestimate the role that the nuclear freeze had in prompting President
Reagan to announce his desire to pursue strategic missile defenses. Jeffery Knopfargues that
"undercutting the freeze movement was not the primary intent behind SDI."156 He correctly
points out that the SDI announcement "was a speech that came from the President's heart." 157
In addition, Reagan's refusal to abandon SDI for arms control at Reykjavik further
underscores the genuineness of the initiative. This line of reasoning, however, misses the
point. There is little question that Reagan was a "true believer" in the Strategic Defense
Initiative. But Reagan also understood that missile defense was a long-term solution. 158
Upon election his immediate priority was to modernize America's forces to regain strategic
superiority for the United States. 159 Only after the freeze movement succeeded in creating
a congressional climate averse to his strategic modernization program, did Reagan turn to
SDI. Reagan believed in missile defenses, but he publicly embraced them in March of 1 983
because he recognized their potential to outflank the freeze movement, shift the political
156 Knopf, Politics, Citizen Activism, and U.S. Arms Control Policy, 465.
157
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landscape surrounding strategic issues, and remove the obstacles to the rest of his strategic
policy. Figure 3.1 is a Brookin's cartoon that depicts the SDI announcement for what it was,
an attempt to shoot down the freeze proposal and Congressional Democrats that were
opposing Reagan's defense program.
Figure 3-1: "Incoming" (Copyright Richmond Times Dispatch 1983;
reprinted with permission.)
Reagan first became preoccupied with the nuclear freeze because its leaders depicted
him as "a trigger-happy cowboy" and it threatened his strategic modernization program.
Concern with the freeze dominates his discussions of defense policy in his memoirs. For
example, he states:
56
Although I convinced many that I wasn't a trigger-happy cowboy, the nuclear
freeze movement marched on unfazed through the summer and fall of 1 982,
while the Democratic majority in congress tried to kill many of the most
important elements ofour military modernization program, including the MX
missile and B-l bomber. 160
Reagan noted that to defeat his defense program, congressional Democrats "were exploiting
some of the public's understandable fears of nuclear war." 161 He became particularly
concerned,
when several prominent Senate Republicans joined in calling for the
abandonment of the Pentagon modernization program partly because of the
heavily publicized views ofa minority ofAmericans who were demonstrating
in favor of a nuclear freeze, I commented in my diary in early March: I'm
going to take our case to the people. 162
Reagan drew his strength from his ability to convince the American people of the
righteousness of his policies. Because the freeze represented a failure in his ability to
communicate, it became personnel. Reagan's daughter Patti became deeply involved in the
freeze movement and convinced her father to meet with prominent freeze leaders. After the
meeting, Reagan believed he had lost his daughter to the movement. 163 Polls indicated he
was also losing the American people. 164
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During the months leading up to the SDI announcement, Reagan's MX proposal fell
to defeat in Congress and the freeze proposal was gaining support in the Democratically
controlled House ofRepresentatives. There was increasing concern in the administration that
passage of even the superficial freeze would signal a willingness of the Congress to vote
against the President's defense program with impunity. 165 In short, the Reagan defense
program was in political disarray.
Realizing that his administration was facing a crisis on strategic policy, Reagan began
to push his staffto develop the missile defense concept. Reagan called a meeting ofthe Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to explore ways "to move away from our total reliance on offense and
to deter a nuclear attack and move toward a greater reliance on defense." 166 The
JCS—following the lead of ChiefofNaval Operations Admiral James Watkins—came back
with unanimous support for a missile defense initiative. 167 Presidential advisors, Howard
Baker and Mike Deaver, informed the President that "an anti-missile program could have
enormous public appeal and saw it as an excellent way to outflank the freeze." 168 Earlier in
the meeting, Admiral Watkins had commented "wouldn't it be better to save lives than to
avenge them." That phrase struck a responsive chord with the President, who remarked:
"don't lose those words."169
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On March 23, 1983, the President Reagan announced his decision to pursue missile
defenses. But first he warned Americans of the dangers of embracing a nuclear freeze:
I know that many of you want peace, and so do 1. 1 know too that many you
believe that nuclear freeze would further the cause of peace. But a freeze
now would make us less, and not, more secure and would raise, not reduce
the risk of war. 170
After appealing to the American people to reject the freeze and support his strategic
modernization program, Reagan laid out his vision ofa world free from the danger ofnuclear
war. He saw a world where strategic defense would enable the United States to "save lives
rather than avenge them," 171 a world where the scientific community would provide the
means to "render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." 172
The speech was a stunning political success. 173 Reagan had personally supervised its
preparation. In his memoirs, Reagan claims that he did "a lot of rewriting. Much of it was
to change bureaucratese into people talk." 174 In actuality, Reagan displayed his mastery of
political imagery by inserting the speeches most memorable phrases. He insisted of inclusion
of Watson's phrase about "saving lives" and personally added his vision ofmaking "nuclear
weapons impotent and obsolete." 175
170 Televised address, 23 March 1983, Public Papers ofthe President: Ronald Reagan, 1983






Polls showed that seventy-five percent of the American people supported the President's
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The demise of the freeze movement can be traced almost directly to Reagan's 23
March 1983 speech. Before the speech, the nuclear freeze had been the primary vehicle for
political discussion about nuclear weapons. The Strategic Defense Initiative allowed the
President to regain command ofthe language ofthe debate and dilute the urgency of the anti-
nuclear movement. In fact, the freeze movement made opposing SDI a major thrust of its
campaign, abandoning its simplistic message for politically benign technical arguments
concerning "counter-force." 176
As a result of SDI, the political climate surrounding defense policy had changed
almost instantly and so did congressional attitudes toward the Reagan defense program. In
1983, the House passed a diluted, meaningless freeze resolution, after which congressional
discussion ofthe freeze all but disappeared. Reagan's strategic modernization program was
approved, if sometimes narrowly, by the Congress. Missile defense, while controversial,
became a firmly established element of the U.S. defense budget. 177
Making SDI a cornerstone of the 1984 Republican election campaign, Reagan co-
opted the peace issue from his opponents. In the 1984 presidential election, he defeated pro-
freeze candidate Walter Mondale by a landslide, dashing the Freeze Campaign's hope of
influencing the election. The Freeze Campaign had been thoroughly neutralized as a force
in American politics.
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E. MYTHS, IMAGES, AND SDI
Competing myths and images were decisive in the rise and fall of the national Freeze
Campaign and the emergence of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The fact that SDI will
forever be synonymous with "Star Wars" is illustrative. Congressional critics used the term
"Star Wars" to communicate to the American people that missile defense was "appalling and
ridiculous idea." 178 Reagan believed the public would see it differently. He pointed out to
his advisors that "Star Wars" reminded Americans of one their favorite movies—one in
which the forces of good prevailed over the forces of an evil empire. 179 Eight years later,
observing America's defensive Patriot missiles intercepting Iraq's offensive Scuds, the Los
Angeles Times would announce the dawn of the "Age of Star Wars." 180
Underlying the nuclear freeze debate were contradictory beliefs about the
relationship between nuclear weapons and American national security. Reagan believed that
a nuclear peace could only be achieved by modernizing American strategic forces in order
to "assure that we would regain and sustain military superiority over the Soviet Union." 181
Freeze activists and their congressional supporters believed that a military buildup would
only pull the "nuclear tripwire tighter," possibly sending the United States over the brink to
nuclear war. 182
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The preeminence of Presidential myth making. President Reagan, by virtue of his
position and persuasive ability, proved to be the nation's most powerful myth maker. He
masterfully crafted his announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to alleviate
the public fears that were driving the opposition to his nuclear program. The nuclear freeze,
however, was facilitated by the Administration's casual and cavalier statements concerning
the prospects of nuclear war. This afforded other national elites the political opportunity to
manipulate powerful images of nuclear war to frame the terms of debate and shape public
and congressional opinion in favor the nuclear freeze. SDI, however successful, was a
reactive strategy necessitated by President Reagan's early failure to command the terms of
the strategic debate.
Political imagery was important tool used by national elites to garner support for both
the nuclear freeze and SDI proposals. After the demise of the Freeze Campaign, its leaders
would complain that "President Reagan simply manipulated the [anti-nuclear] feeling once
it had surfaced, using his greatest weapons: the media."183 In truth, calls for a nuclear freeze
and strategic defenses both manipulated powerful emotion-laden images to perpetuate myths
of strikingly simplistic solutions to the nuclear paradox. Randall Fosberg and other freeze
activists drew vivid images of their audiences' towns and cities being vaporized by nuclear
weapons and argued that the freeze would "lessen the risk of nuclear war." 184 Similarly,
Reagan compelled the public to imagine a world where strategic defenses offered the hope
"that our children and grandchildren could live in a world free of the constant threat of
183
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nuclear war." 185 The key difference was that Reagan's vision tapped into America's deeply
held anticommunist and technological heritage by compelling the public and political elites
to imagine defeating the "evil empire" with American gadgetry that would "render nuclear
weapons impotent and obsolete." 186 Thus, SDI had a more powerful appeal, because unlike
the freeze, it captured the American ethos of optimism, self-reliance, technical innovation,
and manifest destiny. 187
Exploiting the nexus between the media and the public, influential elites shaped
congressional attitudes toward the freeze and SDI. History has shown that the American
public favors the simultaneous pursuit ofboth strength and peace in U.S. foreign and defense
policy. 188 Current events—like the Iran Hostage Crisis, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and
Three Mile Island—allowed the freeze movement to focus public attention on Reagan's
perceived pursuit of strength at the expense of peace. Stoking public fears of nuclear war,
freeze activists and congressional doves fostered an intense anti-nuclear national political
climate. In turn, the Freeze movement came to represent widespread opposition to the newly
elected President's defense policies. Congressional attitudes quickly began to reflect public
sentiments. The Administration noticed a growing congressional opposition to its defense
proposals and began to fear that the freeze movement would undermine its defense program
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all together. President Reagan reacted with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to sooth
the public anxieties that were fueling the opposition to his defense policies. Framing his
initiatives as a method to peacefully reduce the danger of nuclear war, Reagan altered the
political climate, neutralized the freeze movement, and shifted the balance of public and
congressional opinion back in favor of his desired defense policies.
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IV. PATRIOT GAMES: GULF WAR LESSONS
During the buildup to Operation Desert Storm, public anxiety escalated as some
pundits predicted thousands of casualties for American forces. 189 Although President Bush
enjoyed substantial public support for the war, political tensions peaked as he ordered the
beginning of hostilities. 190 Within twenty-four hours of the beginning of coalition air strikes
on Iraqi positions, Saddam Hussein unleashed his potentially most devastating weapons:
Scud missiles. 191 Hussein might have assumed that these missiles could inflict American and
Israeli casualties, provoke an Israeli reaction, create public outrage, undermine coalition
resolve, and force the United States to beg for peace. The ensuing battle in the skies was
broadcast live into every American living room. Night after night, the American people were
mesmerized as they watched Patriot missiles streak into the skies to knock down the Iraqi
Scuds launched at Israel and Saudi Arabia.
As America's overwhelming technological and military supremacy became apparent,
public anxiety gave way to relief, relief to jubilation, and jubilation to euphoria. 192 Patriot's
success came to represent confidence in America's renewed military prowess. Philip Taylor,
in his history of War and the Media, illustrates the power of the Patriot phenomenon:
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The success of the American Patriot missiles in intercepting the Scuds
provided, in microcosm, a televison symbol of the conflict as a whole. It was
a technological duel representing good and evil: the defensive Patriot against
the offensive Scuds, the one protecting innocent women and children against
indiscriminate attack, the other terrifying in their unpredictable and brutal
nature. The very resonance oftheir names implied it all. Here was beneficial
high technology, a spin offofthe American SDI ('Star Wars') program, being
used against relatively primitive weapons of mass destruction from the old
Cold War era: Patriot was the 'Savior of the Skies' and 'The Darling of the
US Arsenal.' 193
Figure 4-1: "Ace Up The Sleeve" (Copyright Providence Journal-Bulletin,
1991 ; reprinted with permission.)
Figure 4-1 is a cartoon that captured the image of Patriot as America's Ace being played
against Iraq's Scuds. From New York to Los Angeles, Scud Busting t-shirts began to appear
193 Taylor, War and The Media, 70.
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on streets all across the country. 194 The powerful public images of Patriot's success reached
deeply in to American popular culture.
How did the powerful images of the Gulf War influence the debate over the
development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems? The debate over Patriot's
performance in the Gulf was not grounded in concerns about the effectiveness or necessity
of theater missile defenses in the post-Cold War international environment. On the contrary,
the argument was quickly framed in terms of the competing Cold War paradigms. Patriot's
political story is one full of savvy, irony, and manipulation. Despite considerable evidence
that its success was vastly oversold, Patriot's persona captured the American imagination,
empowered political elites, and dramatically influenced both the nature and level of missile
defense funding in the 1990s. The Patriot debate illustrates how key players utilize powerful
images to reinforce strategic myths and manipulate public policy.
This chapter examines the role of myths and images in shaping the debate over
Patriot's performance in the Gulf. Section A examines how the images of Patriot's success
were used to rekindle the debate over strategic defenses. Section B describes the Left's
response to the push for increased SDI funding. Section C explains how the images of
Patriot ultimately influenced both the character and level of missile defense funding. Finally,
section D outlines the implications of Patriot experience for future missile defense debates.
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A. THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: PATRIOT REKINDLES THE SDI DEBATE
For over a decade after President Reagan announced his 1 983 initiative to render
nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," congressional Doves had succeeded in curtailing
SDI funding and preventing any efforts to deploy a missile defense system.195 They had been
generally successful at portraying SDI ("Star Wars") as a "boondoggle in the sky" and "a
budget busting fantasy."196 Additionally, President Bush's unenthusiastic support for
strategic defenses had facilitated a forty percent reduction in funding for SDI research during
his first two years in office. 197 In fact—as Doves would continually point out—Patriot was
not a part of SDI, having been originally designed as a defense against enemy aircraft not
missiles. 198 Hawks saw Patriot's success in the Gulf as an opportunity to reverse a decade
of setbacks and forge ahead with developing and deploying missile defenses. 199
In the wake of the Gulf War, missile defense advocates argued that the experience
had refuted several assertions championed by those opposing missile defenses—namely that
deterrence is better than defense, that defending against missile attack is technically
195
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infeasible, and that less-than-perfect (leak-proof) defenses are useless.200 First, they argued
that despite the overwhelming military superiority of coalition forces and the omnipresence
of both the U.S. and Israeli nuclear arsenals, Saddam Hussein was not deterred from
launching Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel.201 Consequently, deterrence is unreliable,
especially against leaders who may have different cultural conceptions of deterrence that are
misunderstood by opposing leaders. Second, Patriot's success proved that missile defenses
are technically possible and that limited defenses can provide substantial protection to
civilian and military personnel.202 Missile defense advocates compelled the public to imagine
a Gulf War without missile defenses the Patriot; a war where every missile could inflict
deadly consequences similar or worst than those of the Dharan barracks tragedy. At Dharan,
a single Iraqi Scud killed twenty-nine American soldiers, the largest single loss of American
lives in the Persian Gulf War.
Understanding that images of the Gulf War powerfully reinforced their arguments,
Hawks rapidly propelled them into the public arena. Within days of the first broadcast
images of the Scud wars over Saudi Arabia and Israel, missile defense advocates fired their
first salvos on the editorial pages of several major American newspapers. 203 They skillfully
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seized popular images in an attempt to reinvigorate the strategic debate and tilt the political
balance in favor of deploying missile defenses. Conservative columnist Patrick Buchanan
typified the argument for missile defenses when he wrote, "using SDI technology, the United
States has now shown it can attack and kill ballistic missiles...The SDI debate is over."204
Similarly, the editors of The Washington Times argued that "the Patriot's success has
inspired demands that Congress devote more spending to SDI and has confirmed the wisdom
of those who point out that nations that fail to adopt state-of-the-art defense technologies
[SDI] often fall victim to nations that have."205
Twelve days after the first Patriot-Scud dual in the skies the conservative rhetoric
manifested itself in a policy initiative. In his January 29, 1991, State of the Union address
President George Bush called for higher missile defense funding. SDI would be reinvented
as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). He stated:
Now, with remarkable technological advances like the Patriot missile, we can
defend against ballistic missile attacks aimed at innocent civilians. Looking
forward, I have directed that the SDI program be refocused on providing
protection from limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source.206
Although some conservatives argue that the initiative was planned prior to the Gulf
War, the administration's attempt to use the images of the Gulf War to bolster political
support for GPALS is indisputable.207 Vice President Quayle argued that "the world learned
204
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an important lesson from the war. A missile can intercept another missile, and...ballistic
missile defense does work."208 Similarly, Secretary ofDefense Richard Cheney claimed that
"you cannot watch the Scuds fly at Tel Aviv and Riyadh and not be concerned that we have
to have a way to develop the capacity and field the capacity to deal with ballistic missiles."209
Without the overwhelming success of American forces in the Gulf, the Patriot
phenomenon, and the President's unprecedented approval ratings, the administration might
not have been willing to expend any political capital to reopen the ABM debate. Patriot had
clearly become the messiah of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Missile defense advocates
believed that President Bush's support, combined with the opposition's political vulnerability
due to their nearly unanimous opposition to the war, would enable them to exploit Patriot as
a fulfilled prophesy of strategic defense theology.210 Their dream of deploying space-based
missile defenses seemed secure.
B. THE REVENGE OF THE NERDS! : SCIENTISTS CHALLENGE PATRIOT
Caught in the euphoria over Patriot's seeming success in the Gulf, missile defense
opponents scrambled to shape a response to the renewed calls for strategic defenses. Despite
the looming shadow oftheir opposition to the GulfWar hanging in the political balance, they
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mustered incredible savvy, flexibility, and resilience in their opposition to GPALS. The
broadcast images of Patriot defeating Scud after Scud seemed irrefutable at the time.
Consequently, missile defense opponents would have to be tenacious and clever to resist the
tidal wave of support for missile defenses.
Congressman Charles Bennett opened the counter offensive by editorializing that
"SDI is no Patriot."211 Bennett acknowledged that "we can all be proud of the Patriot system
. . .a proven battlefield weapon."212 However, he immediately berated those who were trying
to "piggy-back their own pet programs [GPALS] on the back of this success story as sadly
misinformed." The crux of his argument, which was subsequently echoed in several other
editorials, was that Patriot was never part of SDI. Bennett asserted that, in fact, the Strategic
Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) had consistently rejected efforts to invest in defenses
designed to counter tactical missiles like the Scuds that threatened U.S. forces in the Gulf.
Moreover, he argued Patriot's success at shooting down rudimentary Scuds does not translate
into an ability to engage high technology intercontinental ballistic missiles that have multiple
warheads and travel five times as fast.213 Most important, tactical missile defenses, like
Patriot, do not violate theABM treaty which recognizes the "still valid premise" that erecting
a shield against nuclear attack would only prompt the other side to build more missiles to
penetrate such defenses. Finally, he pointed out that the cost of Patriot and other theater
defenses, although not cheap, would be peanuts compared to the cost of deploying SDI.






Bennett's arguments reflected the Dove's initial strategy to simply deny Patriot's
relevance to the debate over strategic defenses. Patriot's success in the Gulf could not
resolve the compelling reasons to resist deploying strategic defenses; technical infeasibility,
unjustifiable costs, and potential of for destabilizing nuclear. Leslie Gelb, in his New York
Times editorial, "Right-Wing Myths," puts it succinctly:
Patriot and Star Wars are both designed to intercept missiles. But the
similarity ends there. It's like saying that since people and elephants both
have ears they can equally enjoy Mozart, and the elephants should be
encouraged to do so. 214
To the Dove's dismay, denying Patriot's relevance and reiterating the technocratic
arguments against strategic defenses, however eloquent, could scarcely compete with
masterful exploitation Gulf War images by strategic defense advocates. For example,
Senator Jon Kyi, a long time SDI supporter, perfected the art:
The contrast could not be clearer: First, television footage of Israelis in gas
masks carefully sifting through the rubble of Iraqi Scud attacks on Tel Aviv
the night before. Then, live pictures of a U.S. Patriot missile streaking
skyward to score a direct hit on an Iraqi Scud. With these TV images,
Americans have vivid evidence ofwhy ballistic missile defense is important,
as well as how effective it can be.215
While the arguments against missile defense remained abstract, Hawks used the television
images of Patriot to turn abstraction into reality. Feeling politically vulnerable, many
staunchly anti-SDI Democrats, including Senator Edward Kennedy, began to cave in on
missile defense issues by offering to support some increases in SDI funding.216
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Congressional support for GPALS was gathering considerable momentum. If ABM
opponents were going to have any success at defeating the proposal, they would have to
change their tactics.
Washington Post columnist Mark Gubrud was the first ABM opponent to clearly
articulate an understanding of the political implications of Patriot's success in Gulf War. In
responding to an pro-SDI editorial he asserted:
that the Patriot success story has led the most casual observers to the
conclusion that the development of missile defenses (meaning SDI) is indeed
both feasible and prudent. He is right, and that is why it is so important to
correct the public perception of Patriot's performance in Gulf.217
Having come to understand that the images of Patriot were more politically palatable
than theological arguments concerning the danger of SDI, Doves no longer praised Patriot
as a battlefield success. Instead, they attempted to undermine Patriot's image.
Leading the anti-Patriot charge was Theodore Postol, a prominent defense analyst
from the Center of International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee on 16 April 1991, Postol argued that
"Patriot's reputation was more myth than reality."218
During the period of the Patriot defense there were 15 fewer Scud attacks [on
Israel] relative to the period when there was no defense. Yet the number of
apartments reported damaged almost tripled, and the number of injuries from
attacks increased by more than 50 percent.219
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Postol's charges were stunning. He argued not just that Patriot was ineffective but also that
Israel may have been better off if Patriot had stayed home.220
Despite widespread debate over Patriot's performance in the Gulf and the
confirmation by the Department of Defense of some of Postol's conclusions, the attempt to
undermine Patriot's powerful first impressions failed to get any traction with the public or
to alter significantly the course ofthe congressional debate over missile defenses.221 At the
end of April, there was a widespread expectation among congressional leaders that the
momentum from Patriot's success would lead to the approval of much of the GPALS
initiative. However, the missile defense opponents unveiled one last political tactic to
undermine space-based systems which were at the heart of the GPALS proposal.
C. SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY: DOVES CUT A DEAL
In order to block complete approval of GPALS, staunch missile defense opponents
temporarily conceded their opposition to theater missile defenses:
Like a judo wrestler turning an opponent's strength to his own advantage,
House Democrats have used President Bush's most politically resonant
argument for the Strategic Defense Initiative against him.222
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In an ironic twist, Doves neutralized conservative efforts to capitalize on Patriot's success
by returning to their original argument that Patriot "is the kind of practical, workable anti-
missile system we should be producing."223 Their characterizations of Patriot had come full
circle. Allying themselves with prominent centrist defense experts, including House Armed
Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman
Sam Nunn, Doves were able to kill plans for deploying the space-based missile defenses that
had constituted the heart of SDL224 Every time conservatives invoked Patriot's success to
bolster their argument for strategic defenses, Doves underscored their support for Patriot-like
land-based systems.225 The ABM opponent's alliance with the congressional moderates,
however, had unintended consequences.
Although most Doves could reluctantly accept theater missile defenses, a vast
majority were opposed to any form of national missile defenses because of their
"destabilizing effect" on U.S.-Russian relations and their belief that missile defense would
bring United States closer to a nuclear confrontation. Consequently, they were severely
disappointed when Senator Nunn editorialized his support for a national missile defense:
As a result of the Gulf War, a strong consensus has developed in support of
building missile interceptors superiors to the Patriots for defending our allies
and U.S. forces deployed in regional conflicts. I support this effort. But why
should Tel Aviv or Riyadh be entitled to protection Atlanta orNew York City
don't have?226
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Having coopted both sides of the issue, Nunn and Aspin had staked out a centrist position
which they believed would preserve strategic stability as well as secure a defense for
American cities. The powerful images of the Gulf War and Patriot were instrumental in
forging that consensus.
D. MYTHS, IMAGES, AND PATRIOT GAMES
Underlying the Patriot debate were conflicting beliefs about the strategic utility of
missile defenses. This Cold War baggage continues to pervade the ABM debate and inhibits
a separate discussion ofTMD. The GulfWar illustrated the practical need for U.S. forces to
defend against theater missiles. The Patriot debate, however, was quickly framed in terms
of outdated Cold War paradigms.
After the intense Patriot debate of the spring, in November of 1991, Congress quietly
approved the deployment of a new anti-missile system for the first time in a quarter century.
The planned call for increased for a twenty-five percent increase in funding for theater and
land-based national missile defenses to be deployed by 1996. The proposal, however, limited
funding for the space-based defenses that are dear to the hearts of missile defense advocates.
Images of Patriot missiles streaking into the skies to knock down Iraq's Scuds were
a powerful public demonstration of the promise and possibility of missile defense. There is
little doubt that images played a decisive role in the shaping congressional attitudes toward
the new ABM legislation. Maj. Gen Malcolm R. O'Niel, director of SDIO at the time,
explained that "the Gulf War left an indelible mark on the majority of the minds of
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Congress."227 The New York Times claimed that:
Washington's decision [to deploy an ABM system] is said by many analyst
to have resulted in large part from the Persian Gulf War. The televised
spectacle of Saddam Hussein's missiles raining down on Israel and allied
troops, and Patriot interceptors flashing up to meet them, instantly turned
abstraction into reality.
228
Consequently, future attempts to undermine missile defense efforts by discrediting Patriot's
powerful first impression are unlikely to succeed, especially when the arguments are strictly
technical and lack powerful images to back them up.
The Patriot debate demonstrates that strategic debates are never completely resolved,
nor are the results explicit. Patriot's role in the Gulf War allowed conservative defense
policy elites to forge a widespread political consensus favoring development of theater
missile defense systems. The Patriot experience, however, did not translate into long-term
congressional support for development, let alone deployment, of a national missile defense
capability. In 1992, newly elected President Bill Clinton would kill the national missile
defense initiative and restructure the missile defense program to focus almost exclusively on
theater missile defense systems. President Clinton's defense program limited the NMD
program to research only, and set the stage for another missile defense controversy with the
election of a Republican Congress in 1994.






V. STRATEGIC MYTHS, NAVAL IMAGES, AND NATIONAL
MISSILE DEFENSE FROM THE SEA
Election of a Republican Congress in 1994 shifted the balance of congressional
opinion in favor of national missile defenses (NMD). However, post-Cold War public
ambivalence on defense issues enabled the Clinton administration—which is filled with
officials who believe missile defenses are destabilizing—to block congressional missile
defense initiatives with political impunity. Low national anxiety denied Republicans the
opportunity to frame the terms of the debate and foster a political climate favorable to their
preferred missile defense policies. Lacking salient images to legitimize and popularize their
arguments for national missile defenses, Republican leaders turned to another method of
deploying an NMD capability. Recognizing the dubious distinction between Navy theater
and national missile defense capabilities, the Congress began to steadily "plus up" funding
for Navy missile defense. Thus, the pursuit of sea-based missile defense capability has thrust
the U.S. Navy into one of the most heated defense controversies of the past three decades:
the dispute over the desirability of erecting ballistic missile defenses.
This chapter explores the congressional motives underlying increased Navy missile
defense funding and suggests implications of the previous ABM debates for the future of
National Missile Defense (NMD) From the Sea. Section A describes the 1995 NMD
controversy and the emergence of the NMD From the Sea concept. Section B examines the
failed attempt by conservative activists to manipulate naval images to reinforce their belief
in national missile defense. Section C characterizes the hostile political waters the Navy
must fair if it prematurely pursues Naval NMD. Section D outlines the inherent political
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advantages of sea-based missile defense that might be exploited in the future. Section E
explores the unresolved questions surrounding sea-based missile defenses that require further
research. Section F summarizes the overall conclusions and recommendations of this thesis.
A. THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE CONTROVERSY
The rebirth of the national missile defense issue began when conservative
activists—most notably the Heritage Foundation and the Center for Security
Policy—convinced Republican leaders to insert a missile defense proposal into the 1994
Contract with America.229 The contract pledged to deploy "at the earliest possible date a cost-
effective, operational antiballistic missile defense system to protect the United States against
ballistic missiles."230 After winning majorities in both the House and Senate, Republicans
were intent on honoring their promise. Republicans made missile defense a central theme
of their defense plan, passing a provision to the Defense Authorization Act mandating
deployment by the year 2003 of a National Missile Defense system capable of defending all
fifty states.
231 On 28 December 1995, President Clinton vetoed the 265 billion-dollar
defense bill citing his strong objection to the National Missile Defense language.232
229 Joseph Cirincione, "Why the Right Lost the Missile Defense Debate," Foreign Policy 106
(Spring 1997): 37-54. Full text available at www.stimson.org.
230 Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey, et. al., Contract With America (New York: Random House,
1994), 107.




Underlying the divisive political struggle over the 1996 Defense Authorization Act
were differences in beliefs about the desirability of strategic defenses. Conservatives believed
that defending American cities should be America's top defense priority. In contrast,
administration officials and congressional doves believed that deploying missile defenses
would undermine arms control rendering the United States less secure.
Backed by General Shalikashvili, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President
justified his veto ofthe Republicans' defense proposal. "By setting U.S. policy on a collision
course with the ABM treaty," Clinton explained, "the bill would jeopardize continued
Russian implementation of START I as well as Russian ratification of the START II
Treaty."233 Officials in the Administration believed that mandating the deployment of
dubious missile defenses would inhibit the destruction of thousands of Russian warheads.
Fueling the administration's concerns was the Russian parliament's failure to ratify
the START II agreement which required them to reduce their delivery capability from 8,000
to 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads. Peter Zimmerman, former advisor to the International
Security and Arms Control Agency asserts:
why should we trash an agreement that would remove 8,000 warheads pointed at us
so that we can defend against countries without any capability of reaching us with a
nuclear missile. As far as I know, any Russian warhead we get chopped up and
destroyed is one that we have defended against perfectly.234
President Clinton's argument against deployment ofNMD was bolstered by a recent national
233
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235 Although the estimate is secret, Richard N. Cooper, chairman of the
National Intelligence Council, summarized the document in a letter to House National
Security Committee. He stated that U.S. intelligence agencies have determined that an attack
by Russian or Chinese strategic forces is unlikely.236 Moreover, the report claimed that
hostile countries, like North Korea and Iran, would be unable to acquire long-range ballistic
missile technology for an estimated ten to fifteen years and that the missile technology
control agreement had "significantly limited international transfer of missiles components
and related technologies."237
These arguments against NMD were challenged on all grounds by the Republican
Congress. Senator Trent Lott (R-Miss.) argued that committing to the deployment of
national missile defense would not affect arms control agreements. Lott claimed that "if
Russia does not ratify START II it may be because of the Communists and Nationalists who
were just elected to their parliamentary body, not because of this missile defense
language."238 Furthermore, the bill's proponents pointed out that some national missile
defenses are allowed under the 1972 ABM Treaty.239
Republicans also challenged the administration's threat estimate. Noting recent
Chinese missile threats against Taiwan and the United States, the advancing North Korean
235 Pat Towell, "GOP, Democrats Cross Swords Over Anti-Missile Systems," Congressional
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ballistic missile program, and the uncontrolled spread of Russian missile technology, Senate
Armed Services Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) prophesied "an existing
and expanding threat to the United States from ballistic missiles." Thurmond cited testimony
by a former CIA director, William O. Studeman who stated that a new Korean ballistic
missile could easily be operational by the end of the decade.240
Republicans discounted the effectiveness of the agreement limiting missile
technology exports. Congressman Curt Weldon (R-Pa.) explained that the recent interception
of Soviet made high technology missile guidance equipment on its way to Iraq, suggests that
the Russians are either"unwilling or unable to comply with the agreement."241
Just prior to the President's veto, the NMD debate achieved new intensity. On
December 21, 1996, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Sen. William Cohen (R-Maine), men
long respected for their ability to forge bipartisan compromise on strategic issues, openly
quarreled on the floor of the Senate. "There is no need for . . . ironclad commitments today
to deploy by a date certain a defense that is clearly an anticipatory breach of the ABM
Treaty," Nunn declared.242 Chastising Nunn, Cohen rebutted, "the fact of the matter is that
the Administration is opposed to deployment of any system of any kind to defend the
American people."243









In 1 99 1 , Cohen and Nunn had forged a congressional consensus for deploying a land-
based NMD capability. This dispute between the "cerebral centrists" demonstrated that the
middle ground on missile defense had evaporated. A Presidential veto was imminent.
Unable to muster the votes to override the President's veto and trapped by their previous
approval of the defense appropriations bill, the Republicans were forced to remove the
language mandating the deployment of National Missile Defense.244
Lacking salient images to legitimize and popularize their arguments for national
missile defenses, Republican leaders turned to another method of deploying an NMD
capability. Recognizing the dubious distinction between Navy theater and national missile
defense capabilities, the Congress began to "plus up" funding for Navy theater missile
defense programs. Representative Curt Weldon would later bluntly explain the motive
behind the increased funding:
We have funded that system to a higher level, again in line with what the
Navy says they need to move aggressively, to see whether or not Navy upper
tier offer us the potential well beyond protecting a fleet of ships, perhaps even
becoming eventually a national missile defense system.245
In essence, conservatives believed that deploying a sea-based missile defense would in effect
"provide a national missile defense capability through the back door."246
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B. THE MISSING NEXUS: POWERFUL IMAGES & PERCEPTIONS
Angered by the Presidential veto and citing polls identifying potential "public
outrage" over the neglect of missile defense, Republican strategists advocated making NMD
a 1 996 campaign issue.247 A key architect of the missile defense campaign was former
Reagan deputy assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Gafmey. In April 1996, the Wall Street
Journal explained that "by tirelessly pushing results of polls and studies of focus groups, he
[Gafmey] has convinced Republican leaders that backing national missile defense can be a
winning issue in the fall."248
Gafmey realized, however, that the missile defense issue lacked political salience
because the American public did not feel threatened by ballistic missiles.249 To correct the
problem, he contemplated a media strategy designed to connect the voter to images of a
missile threat and the Republican solution. First, a commercial was developed showing a
rogue dictator launching a ballistic missile at the United States, followed by a scene of an
American General informing the President that the military could do nothing to stop the
missile. Second, missile defense advocates tried to convince Bob Dole to embrace the
concept of sea-based national missile defenses. They envisioned him standing on the deck
of a destroyer proclaiming that Aegis ships offered a cost-effective solution for defending
American cities, a solution the President had neglected because of his outdated Cold War
247
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thinking.250 Dole rejected this idea because of his reluctance to manipulate active duty
military forces for political purposes and never funded the widespread airing of the missile
defense commercial.251 Instead, Dole chose a strictly verbal campaign promising that "on
my first day in office, I will set America on a course that will end our vulnerability to missile
attack."
252 Democrats promptly responded with images, characterizing the "Dole-Gingrich
NMD plan as an attempt to resurrect Star Wars."253 Figure 5-1 is an R.J. Matson editorial
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Figure 5-1: The Return of Star Wars (Roll Call and
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Liberal columnists attacked Dole asserting that "any candidate who claims to be for
lower deficits, but votes for Star Wars has some serious explaining to do."254 The Clinton
Presidential campaign also responded to the Dole NMD initiative. Democratic members of
Congress and independent analysts "worked closely with the administration to help frame
the terms of the debate."255 As a result, President Clinton introduced his "responsible
program for national missile defense."256 Clinton pledged to develop the NMD technology
in three years, and then be prepared to build the initial ground-based site in three years if it
is needed. This proposal, know as "3 + 3," was a clever political ploy developed by Vice
President Gore's national security advisor, Leon Firth, to co-opt the missile defense issue.
Firth, a long time opponent of missile defense, understood that the "3 + 3" initiative would
"indefinitely delay deployment ofany national missile defenses while neutralizing the subject
as a campaign issue."257
The Clinton campaign emphasized that the Dole proposal would violate the ABM
Treaty, and put at risk reductions in missiles and bombers carrying thousands of nuclear
warheads. In contrast, Clinton plan would "ensure the deployment of the best possibleNMD
system if and when the threat emerges, preserve the ABM Treaty, and ensure the two-thirds
reduction in U.S. and Russian nuclear inventories mandated by START I and II."258
254 Jennifer Weeks, "Military Gets a Free Pass," Chicago Sun-Times, 22 May 1996.
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Clinton's clever "3 + 3" initiative combined with Dole's failure to embrace a media
strategy guaranteed that the claim that "Clinton's opposition to missile defense is one of the
most negligent, short-sighted, irresponsible, and potentially catastrophic policies in history,"
would never resonate with voters. Unable to imagine the threat or a viable solution, the
public remained apathetic toward missile defense. During the 1996 campaign, defense issues
never made the "Top Eight" matters voters considered important.259 In the end, less three in
ten Americans supported Dole's proposal to defend America.260 Given their failure to make
NMD a national issue, Republicans began to see the Navy's theater systems as an
increasingly attractive option for defending American cities.
C. THE POLITICS OF NMD FROM THE SEA
Frustrated by the "3 +3 " initiative, some congressional missile defense advocates
began taking the position that Clinton's ground-based NMD program should be abandoned
because of its expense and lack of timeliness; instead, they argued that "we should press
ahead to make the Navy Theater Wide defense all it can be."261 They claimed that the money
saved by canceling the more expensive, less effective ground-based defense would more than
pay for the Navy's program.262 Senator John Kyi (R-AZ) has openly articulated this position:
259 Bradley Graham, "Missile Defense Failing to Launch as Voting Issue." Washington Post. 28
July 1996; and "Voters: The Reasons Why," NationalJournal, 9 November 1996, 2408.





Ibid. Senator Kyle's office estimates the cost ofNaval NMD to be $3 million and the CBO
projects a cost of 5 Billion, by far the most inexpensive NMD option currently available.
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We should immediately upgrade the Navy's Aegis cruisers with long-range
defensive interceptors, enabling a global defense that can protect not only
America's overseas troops and allies, but also Americans at home. 263
Thus, sea-based missile defense has become a cornerstone ofthe conservative push to defend
America from missile attacks. Some NMD advocates are pressing "the naval leadership to
act now to communicate the strengths of the Naval NMD Concept."264 They claim that the
Navy "could not ask for a more favorable climate" for articulating its potential NMD
solution,265 an assertion that must be viewed with extreme caution.
1. Hostile Political Waters
Despite claims to the contrary, a premature decision to openly pursue Navy NMD
would send the naval service needlessly into hostile political waters. Continued public
apathy on defense issues might allow the President to continue to undermineNMD initiatives
with impunity, regardless ofcongressional support. The major obstacle to Naval NMD is the
Administration's belief that the ABM Treaty best advances American security. The ABM
Treaty expressly prohibits sea-based strategic defenses.266 Republican calls to abandon this
"Cold War relic," have fallen on deaf ears in the administration.267 Even conservatives
263 Senator Jon Kyi, "OP-ED," Wall Street Journal, May 22, 1997.
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acknowledge that under current political circumstances, treaty compliance is prerequisite for
sustained funding of any missile defense effort.268
The stakes for the Navy are high. Pursuing an NMD capability could undermine
support for the Aegis program all togther. This possibility is not as far-fetched as it might
seem. Outspoken critics have argued that Navy missile defenses have "dubious value" and
are simply a Navy ploy to justify largely superfluous Aegis ships.269 Some of these
arguments have apparently resonated in the White House. In September of this year, some
Presidential advisors advocated that the President use his line item veto authority to strike
some funding for the DDG-51 program.270 Desiring to avoid a direct fight with senate
majority leader and other key congressional members the President rejected the idea.271
Nevertheless, the White House staffs enmity for anything amounting to national
missile defense definitely played a role in their line-item veto thinking. The President cut
$30 million that would have financed research on tracking and intercepting asteroids before
they collide with Earth, claiming the asteroid project is a thinly disguised effort to conduct
national missile defense research.272
268 Interview with House of Representatives and Senate professional staffs, 10 September 1997.
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Despite the recognition that increased funding for Navy Upper Tier is another thinly
disguised effort to deploy a national missile defense, neither the administration nor
congressional doves have strongly opposed the initiative. Some Republicans in Congress
"are surprised that a larger opposition to Navy missile defense has not yet developed."273
Several factors underlie the current lack of opposition to Navy missile defense. Compared
to other missile defense programs, like the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD), the Navy program is in its infancy. Moreover, congressional Democrats believe
that any NMD capable, Navy system is unlikely to be rendered ABM treaty compliant by the
Clinton's Arms Control Implementation and Compliance Office.274 One highly placed
congressional staffer, however, warned that if Navy Upper Tier begins to make serious
progress toward deployment "expect a firestorm of political opposition from the Left,"275
opposition the Navy is unlikely overcome unless the political circumstances change.
In some ways, the Navy's staunchest advocates may be its worst enemies.276 In their
recent efforts, missile defense activists have displayed neither the creative knack nor the keen
sense of timing necessary for successful myth making. The Navy should not succumb to
pressure to develop prematurely an NMD capability. Absent a national consensus to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty, the Navy should avoid openly pursuing Naval NMD.
273 Interview with Senate Armed Services Committee professional staff, 10 September 1997.
274 Interview with House and Senate professional staff, 10 September 1997.
275 Interview with White House National Security Council staff member, 1 1 September 1997.
276 Interview with John Isaacs, Executive Director, Council for Livable World, 9 September 1997.
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2. Naval NMD: A Natural Defense
National Missile Defense From the Sea is an idea whose political moment has not yet
arrived. A public desire for NMD, however, may come sooner than anyone thinks. Several
alarming international trends—the proliferation of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass
destruction, and the increasing possibility of an accidental missile launch—could lead to
events that would fuel public anxieties and provide the opportunity for missile defense
advocates to foster a national consensus favoring withdrawal from the ABM treaty and
immediate deployment of anNMD capability. Publicity surrounding events such as the 1 995
Russia full-scale nuclear alert could be decisive. President Yeltsin activated his nuclear
briefcase when Russian air defenses mistook a Norwegian scientific rocket for American
Trident Missile.277 Images of an Iranian or North Korean nuclear test or the launch of a
missile against the United States or one of our allies would instantly change the political
climate surrounding national missile defense. 278
When the political opportunity arises, history has shown that key individuals can
manipulate powerful images to shift the climate of public, Presidential, and congressional
opinion starkly in favor of national missile defense. Considering the current conservative
fixation on the NMD From the Sea concept and previous discussions of using Aegis ships
in political efforts to foster support for missile defense, naval images are likely to play a role
in future efforts to promote NMD. Naval leaders must think through how the exploitation
of naval images might complement or complicate Navy program planning.
277 Bruce Nelan, "Nuclear Disarray," Time, 19 May 1996, 46.
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Sea-based missile defenses have inherent domestic political advantages over other
missile defense options. Deploying land-based national missile defenses evokes images of
having to fight the war literally "from America's backyards," an unsettling idea that
generated widespread protest during previous ABM debates. The American people prefer
a forward defense that holds threats at arm's length. They expect the American military to
stand in harm's way as necessary to protect American lives, property, and interests.
American safety is to be secured offshore and wars are to be fought far from U.S. soil.279
Bringing the fight home is contrary to the American ethos. Mahan got it right when he
wrote, "every danger of a military character to which the United States is exposed is best met
outside her territory—at sea."280 If the American public becomes anxious about emerging
missile threats, thenNMD From the Sea can provide a culturally consistent answer, allowing
Americans to envision a forward missile defense that interdicts the threat "over there" and
not over here. In essence, Naval NMD is a natural defense for the United States.
Naval NMD is also consistent with Americans sense of national mission, it could
help the United States to promote international peace and stability.281 Theodore Roosevelt
set the twentieth century precedent when he forged a vision where "U.S. military power was
used to promote world stability, and U.S. naval forces became an active instrument of
279 Michael Vlahos, Strategic Defense and the American Ethos (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986),
98.
280 Captain A.T. Mahan quoted in Dictionary ofMilitary and Naval Quotations, ed. Colonel




American mission."282 During the Cold War, the U.S. sense of mission was reflected by
overseas presence and extended nuclear deterrence. Naval NMD allows the American
people to see the U.S. Navy as the provider of extended defense to complement extended
deterrence. From international waters, for example, naval ships would be capable of
defending all of Japan, North Korea, Israel, and most of Europe.283 The United States must
cope with international sensitivities surrounding missile defense, but a non-committing naval
missile defense is likely to be less controversial than a land-based system.284
Auxiliary assertions about cost and capabilities are always a factor in bolstering
arguments surrounding any missile defense system. Naval NMD offers an extremely cost-
effective solution. American taxpayers have already invested $50 billion in the Aegis ships
that are deployed around the world.285 Upgrading the Aegis system to be NMD capable
would cost only $3-6 billion compared to at least $30 billion for other proposed NMD
systems.
286 Navy Upper Tier also offers the longest range (more than a thousand miles) and
highest velocity interceptors of any system currently under development. A forward
deployed missile defense would be highly capable of intercepting missiles in the ascent phase
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D. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
This thesis outlines the domestic political considerations surrounding missile defense
and suggested implications for National Missile Defense From the Sea. Focusing on how key
individuals manipulate powerful images to legitimize and popularize their beliefs is key to
understanding and reacting to shifts in congressional attitudes toward missile defense.
However, even if myth makers interpret images and events to foster a domestic political
climate that favors withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and deploying robust national missile
defenses, there will be a number of obstacles to a sea-based option that require additional
study. Institutional, operational, and programmatic barriers need close examination.
Exploiting the inherent political advantages ofNMD From the Sea will require broad
institutional support for a new naval mission. Current Navy support for TMBD programs
is shallow at best. One high placed naval officer explained that if the Navy embraces the
missile defense mission "we will lose those ships to STRATCOM."288 Unless broader
institutional support for Navy missile defense can be fostered, the Navy may be incapable
of presenting a coherentNMD proposal when the opportunity arises. Therefore, studying the
roots of the Navy institutional attitudes toward missile defense is an area ripe for further
study.
The Navy must also contemplate new operational concepts to accommodate a Naval
NMD capability. Pursuing NavalNMD could diminish the Navy's ability to remain forward
deployed. In the midst ofa serious missile threat, Congress and the public is likely to demand
any missile defense be used to defend America first. This new requirement could leave the
288 Interview with a highly placed officer on the Navy Staff, 9 September 1997.
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country with insufficient naval surface forces to protect its forward deployed Carrier Battle
and Amphibious Ready Groups. The substantial range of the Navy Upper Tier capability,
more than a thousand miles, can help mitigate these concerns. To better understand these
issues a detailed assessment ofNMD operational factors is required.
The Navy must also carefully contemplate its missile defense development and
acquisition strategy. While the relationship between elites, myths, and powerful images can
help explain shifts in congressional funding, it cannot explain the lack of missile defenses
to defend American cities. Several times missile defense advocates have secured substantial
political support and funding to develop a missile defense capability. Yet the United States
remains incapable of defending its cities from foreign missile attacks. Successful myth
making can prove futile in the absence ofa technological system builder who has the singular
determination to overcome formidable technical hurdles, focus the program on clearly
definable goals, demand results, cultivate alliances, and manage critical resources.289
SDI, for example, took an academic approach to the missile defense problem,
spreading resources to thin and failing to concentrate resources on clearly definable goals.
In contrast, a successful Naval NMD must be patterned after Admiral Rickover's nuclear
power or Admiral Raborn's submarine-launched ballistic missile program. A study of these
successful naval innovations would be instructive and might help the assure the success of
a Naval NMD program.
289 For a discussion of the importance of technological system builders see Peter R. Lavoy,
Learning to Live with the Bomb?, 100-102.
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E. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
1. Framing Congressional Attitudes
This study has demonstrated that congressional defense policy making cannot be
understood by simply examining the incentives and motivations underlying a series of floor
votes on various defense issues. While it is true that Congress members support initiatives
that they perceive to be a combination of sound policy and good politics, voting decisions
are not made in a vacuum. Framing—or myth making
—
places political incentives in context
and shapes congressional perceptions ofwhat constitutes sound policy. Elites use a variety
of techniques to attract media coverage, interpret events and images, define the terms of the
debate, and foster a favorable climate of opinion surrounding their desired policy option.
Congress members, in turn, simultaneously take cues from the public and political leaders
that influence their attitudes and subsequent voting behavior. Understanding the relationship
between political elites, strategic beliefs, and popular images in shaping congressional
attitudes is not intended to replace deferential, parochial, or policy lenses; instead, it explains
the process that links these factors to congressional decision-making.
Missile defense controversies have become a perennial characteristic of American
strategic discourse. This study examined the role of the framing process in four divisive
congressional debates over missile defense to draw implications for the Navy's role in the
ongoing NMD debate. Underlying each debate studied were deeply held convictions about
how deploying missile defenses might affect American security. Lacking concrete evidence,
key players consistently manipulated powerful images to perpetuate their strategic arguments.
During "The Great ABM Debate" of the 1960s, elites successfully manipulated the image
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of a mushroom cloud exploding over America's backyards to create intense public resistance
to the Sentinel ABM system. Ten years later, President Reagan's crusade against the "evil
empire" combined with horrific descriptions of a nuclear holocaust gave political life to the
nuclear freeze movement and reinforced the desire for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
More recently, images of the Patriot missile during Gulf War became the fulcrum for
manipulating public and congressional attitudes toward missile defenses.
Each of these cases illustrated that success or failure of any missile defense effort
depends largely upon the ability of key individuals to create or interpret events and images
to legitimize and popularize their arguments in favor of missile defenses. Today, elite
opinion concerning the strategic utility of missile defenses is still polarized. A balance of
myths remains. However, key players stand ready to seize the next powerful image to
reinforce their strategic arguments and tilt the political balance in favor of their desired
missile defense policies.
2. Advocating Aegis: The Way Ahead!
Prematurely pursuing an NMD capability could undermine support for the Aegis
program . Continued public apathy on defense issues might allow the President to undermine
NMD initiatives with political impunity, regardless of congressional support. Maintaining
the shallow political consensus that is currently driving Navy missile defense programs will
require the Navy to walk a political tightrope between disparate political factions. Success
might ultimately rest on the cautious pursuit of ABM "treaty compliant" Navy theater
systems while making closely-held preparations to upgrade those systems to defend
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American cities should a culmination of events, popular images, and political beliefs compel
political leaders to demand such a capability.
Studies are needed to examine the institutional, operational, and programmatic
factors that would underlie a Naw NMD effort . Success of Naval NMD will depend upon
the infrastructure underlying the Navy theater missile defense program. The Navy must
identify a clear path to overcoming institutional, financial, and technological hurdles to Naval
NMD. The right people must be positioned to establish clearly definable goals, demand that
milestones are reached on time, and ensure that resources are managed properly. Institutional
support inside the Navy must be cultivated and the operational implications ofthis new naval
mission must be fully explored.
The importance of naval images should not be underestimated . Success or failure of
a Naval NMD program is likely to depend largely upon the ability of key individuals to
create or interpret events and images to legitimize and popularize their arguments in favor
of the Navy's programs. Two sets of images are important. To embrace the Naval NMD
solution, the public and elites to must first imagine the seriousness of missile problem.
Events—such as an Iranian nuclear test, a missile attack on America or our allies, or
widespread publicity of Russian command and control problems—might create an
opportunity for missile defense advocates to foster a national consensus favoring withdrawal
from the ABM treaty and immediate deployment of an NMD capability.
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When the nation calls, the Navy could be poised to offer a quick, cost-effective, and
culturally consistent. NMD solution . Disseminating images of surface combatants
conducting theater missile defense demonstrations and exercises could pave the way for
public support of Naval NMD. Properly presented, the NMD From the Sea concept could
help alleviate public fears of foreign missiles by establishing a forward defense of the
homeland while serving America's mission to provide an extended defense that promotes
world stability. Naval NMD is a natural defense of the United States. Just as Aegis was the
mythological shield that protected Zeus from deadly threats, when the missile threat becomes
apparent to the American people—the image ofAegis ships standing in harm's way to shield




STRATEGIC MYTHS CONCERNING MISSILE DEFENSE
Congressional attitudes toward missile defense reflect the strategic myths—the
unverified beliefs about the relationship between weapons of mass destruction, missile
defenses, and security—that surround the missile defenses debate. Although attitudes
towards missile defense encompass a wide spectrum of ideas, their proponents can be
grouped into three categories: Hawks, Doves, and Owls. 1 Strategic Hawks are individuals
who believe that missile defenses increase security by reducing the vulnerability of both the
strategic arsenal and the American public. Strategic Doves are people who believe that
deployment of strategic defenses is destabilizing and would unnecessarily escalate the
nuclear arms race bringing the nation closer to the brink of nuclear war. Strategic Owls, or
moderates, are individuals who only favor missile defense for limited protection or in an
overall deterrent-stabilizing context.
A. THE CULT OF SUPERIORITY
Strategic Hawks' beliefs are rooted in the experiences of World War Two. To them,
appeasement failed when Western policies exploded after the Munich conference of 1938.
Chamberlain's pronouncement "that there would be peace in our time" proved disastrous. 2
1 These descriptions are adaptation of the categories described by Graham T. Allison, Albert
Carnesale, and Joseph Nye, Jr., Hawks, Doves, and Owls (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985).
2 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press., 1976), 59.
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The Hawk's position can be summarized by the popular Roman adage: "he who wants peace,
must prepare for war."
The Reagan administration's early defense policy initiatives reflected a pure
manifestation of the belief in "peace through strength." In his autobiography, former
President Ronald Reagan, the vicar of conservative strategic values, explained that the
impetus behind the massive military buildup ofthe early 1980's was to "assure that we would
regain and sustain military superiority over the Soviet Union."3 Seeking strategic superiority
is the best policy to deter nuclear aggression and to limit nuclear damage while avoiding the
"surrender of freedom should deterrence fail."4 Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger
articulated this position when he openly talked about the need to prevail in a nuclear
confrontation:
Should deterrence fail and strategic nuclear war with the USSR occur, the United
States must prevail. You show me a secretary of Defense who is planning not to
prevail and I'll show you a Secretary ofDefense that ought to be impeached.5
In essence, missile defenses reduce a state's vulnerability to attack and enhance a state's
ability to prevail in a nuclear war.
If "peace through strength" describes the impetus for the Hawk's quest for
superiority, then their enmity for the doctrine of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction)
provides the other key to understanding their support for missile defenses. On the one hand,
3 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1990), 294.
4
Albert Wohlstetter, "Between an Unfree World and None: Increasing Our Choices," Foreign
Affairs (Summer 1985), 991.
5 Quoted in Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution ofNuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1989), 406.
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they seek to maintain superiority to bolster deterrence and to insure victory if deterrence fails.
On the other hand, they believe that the concept of mutually assured destruction, which
requires that you hold your enemy's population hostage to nuclear attack, is morally
bankrupt. In calling for the Strategic Defense Initiative, President Reagan asked:
Wouldn't it be better to save lives than avenge them?; and what if people could live
secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant US
retaliation to deter Soviet attack, that we could destroy strategic ballistic missiles
before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?6
Consequently, missile defenses' perceived ability to assure strategic superiority while helping
escape mutually assured destruction have made them a cornerstone ofthe Hawk's theology.
B. THE COCOON OF STABILITY
Strategic moderates—or Owls—generally favor hedging against strategic uncertainty.
Therefore, they simultaneously favor arms control, limited missile defenses, and strategic
modernization. At the core oftheir beliefs is the idea that none ofthese policies can alter the
condition of mutual vulnerability. In the paradoxical logic of mutual nuclear deterrence,
strategic stability reflects the conviction that the safety of each superpower depends on the
vulnerability of both.7 Mutual vulnerability assures that neither side will attack the other
for fear of devastating retaliation. To Owls, mutually assured destruction is not an immoral
policy but rather a "grim fact of life."8
6 Ronald W. Reagan, transcript of 23 March 1993 speech, in "President Speech on Military
Spending and a New Defense," New York Times, 24 March 1983, A-20.
7
Pat Towell, 'Breakthrough Senate SDI Pact Presages Conference Fight," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Review, 3 August 1991, 2181; Freedman, 407-408.
8 Robert S. McNamara, Blundering into Disaster (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 34-130.
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Moderates doubt that a nuclear arms race would actually increase the likelihood of
nuclear war. But since increasing the size of our nuclear arsenal cannot obviate the reality
of mutually assured destruction, massive nuclear build ups are undesirable because they
produce the same end state at higher cost to the American taxpayer.
Preserving the quantity and quality of nuclear forces, however, is key to avoiding a
first strike during a crisis. This concern was forcefully articulated by ten leading Owls in a
1 986 article in the Atlantic Monthly:
Decision-makers would be under great pressure during a crisis. There would be a
strong incentive to fire off nuclear weapons before they could be destroyed on their
launchers.9
Strategic modernization and arms control, taken together, provide the best mechanism to
prevent a first strike by ensuring that the strategic deterrent as a whole is amply survivable
and by reassuring our adversaries that a nuclear attack is unlikely.
Owls endorsed the 1972 ABM treaty which codified the concept of strategic stability
by prohibiting the deployment of widespread national missile defenses. However, their
concerns about the possibility of an accidental launch or a limited strike often cause them to
support the development ofABM "treaty compliant" limited missile defense systems. In
addition, they generally are willing to entertain arguments that place missile defenses in the
overall deterrence-stabilizing context. Thus, moderates have proven to be the brokers of any
strategic debate and are therefore the object of strategic myth making by both Hawks and
9 McGeorge Bundy, Morton H. Halperin, William F. Kaufrnann, George F. Kennan, Robert S.
McNamara, Madelene O'Donnell, Leon V. Segal, Gerard C. Smith, Richard H. Ulman, and Paul C.
Warnke, "Back from the Brink," Atlantic Monthly (August 1996): 36.
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Doves. But the Owl's unverified strategic beliefs are no less intensely held than those of
other political actors. They can be equally savvy about manipulating images to reinforce their
beliefs in attempts to foster support for their initiatives.
C. THE ORDER OF NUCLEAR ELIMINATION
The Strategic Doves' opposition to missile defenses traces back to the spiral model
of international relations; the idea that arms races are fueled by fear and mutual and that a
spiral of tension leads to massive arms buildup and eventual war. 10 Coversely, if one side
unilaterally disarms or at least ceases weapons production, the spiral of tension would be
halted and the risk of war would be reduced. To prevent the spiral of nuclear tension from
escalating into nuclear war, Doves have advocate establishing strategic stability—a stable
balance of mutual fear and distrust—only as a first step toward the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons.
Doves believe that mutual vulnerability can only be alleviated through severe arms
reductions ultimately leading to complete nuclear disarmament. They believe that the
existence of nuclear weapons is a clear and present danger to human existence that far
exceeds any political purpose." Therefore, Doves argue that "we can never taste real peace
again until we find a means to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether."12
10 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperceptions in International Politics, 62.
11 This argument is forcefully articulated by Jonathon Schell, The Abolition (New York: Avon
Books, 1984), 27.
12 Richard Falk, a persistent peace activist, quoted in Adam Garfinkle, The Politics ofthe Nuclear
Freeze (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984), 5.
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Doves believe that deploying missile defenses would start a nuclear arms race and
increase pressures for a preemptive first strike. Deploying missile defenses to seek
superiority or to lower nuclear vulnerability would be counterproductive, provocative, and
destabilizing.
13 At best, missile defenses would act as an impediment to negotiating
reductions in strategic arsenals. Peter Zimmerman, former advisor to the International
Security and Arms Control Agency explains the Dove's argument:
Why should we trash an agreement that would remove 8,000 warheads pointed at us
so that we can defend against countries without any capability of reaching us with a
nuclear missile. As far as I know, any Russian warhead we get chopped up and
destroyed is one that we have defended against perfectly. 14
Doves believe that disarmament through arms control will best increase America's security.
In their minds, missile defenses serve as catalyst for the arms race, undermine stability, and
send the nuclear clock spiraling toward midnight.
13
Ibid.
14 Kenneth J. Garcia, "Star Wars Making a Comeback Conservatives Push to revive space-based
defense system," San Francisco Chronicle, 21 December, 1995, Al.
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